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Extending the military principle of maneuver into war-fighting domain of cyberspace, aca-
demic and military researchers have produced many theoretical and strategic works, though few
have focused on researching actual applications and systems that apply this principle. We present
our research in designing, building and modeling maneuverable applications in order to gain the sys-
tem advantages of resource provisioning, application optimization, and cybersecurity improvement.
We have coined the phrase “Maneuverable Applications” to be defined as distributed and parallel
application that take advantage of the modification, relocation, addition or removal of computing
resources, giving the perception of movement. Our work with maneuverable applications has been
within shared computing resources, such as the Clemson University Palmetto cluster, where mul-
tiple users share access and time to a collection of inter-networked computers and servers. In this
dissertation, we describe our implementation and analytic modeling of environments and systems
to maneuver computational nodes, network capabilities, and security enhancements for overcoming
challenges to a cyberspace platform. Specifically we describe our work to create a system to provi-
sion a big data computational resource within academic environments. We also present a computing
testbed built to allow researchers to study network optimizations of data centers. We discuss our
Petri Net model of an adaptable system, which increases its cybersecurity posture in the face of
varying levels of threat from malicious actors. Lastly, we present work and investigation into in-
tegrating these technologies into a prototype resource manager for maneuverable applications and
validating our model using this implementation.
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In 2010, William J. Lynn III, former United States Deputy Secretary of Defense, publicly
released the details of a previously classified incident of the spread of malicious computer code across
the U.S. military’s unclassified and classified computer networks [59]. This malware was the product
of a foreign intelligence service and was spread through the unauthorized movement of USB based
flash drives between computing systems with different levels of classification. The efforts of the
Department of Defense to counter the attack was known as Operation Buckshot Yankee and was
managed at the highest levels of the Department due to the sensitivity and urgency. The highly
visible release of information to the public highlighted the scope of daily cyber attacks and intrusions
faced by the Pentagon and its military. This incident emphasized the need for improved operations
and defense in the newest warfighting domain.
Since the mid 1940s, warfighting has been restricted to the traditional domains of land,
sea, and air. Recent technological advances have led to adding space and cyberspace to the list
of operational domains. With the expansion of domains to conduct combat operations, traditional
military doctrine, technology, and tactics must be reevaluated or expanded to provide consistency
across the entire military spectrum. This challenge has presented a plethora of opportunities for
strategic debate, theoretical analysis, and technological research.
Many traditional military topics have been expanded and applied into the cyberspace domain
[72]. These include the concept of situational awareness [32], key terrain [76], and defense in depth
[87]. A basic military concept that has received extensive theoretical review is maneuver [16,35,83].
Though empowered by this theoretical research, there has been limited work in building systems
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that exhibit the characteristics and behaviors of maneuver [21,22,42].
Maneuver is one of the U.S. Army’s nine Principles of War [17]. Maneuver includes the
application of combat power to maintain an advantage over the enemy. This flexible and dynamic
employment of resources ensures success by keeping adversarial conditions imbalanced and thus
reduces failures, compromises, and vulnerabilities. The non-military use of the word maneuver
describes an action that is not random or without purpose, but one that is clever or skillful. In
both environments the word maneuver implies deliberate movement and actions taken to achieve a
specific purpose.
Distributed and parallel applications allow the execution of complex computations that
previously were deemed impractical. Many recent technological advances have contributed to the
widespread growth of distributed computing, namely multi-core processors, multi-processor nodes,
high speed networks, improved storage technologies, and virtualization. Regional and national
researchers have combined funding and resources to build expansive, large-scale shared computing
clusters to allow more efficient usage of power, space, and cooling to multiple user groups. These
shared computing resources have become the standard high performance computational platforms
that annually appear on the list of the most powerful commercially available computer systems
known [9]. Even with these tremendous achievements, the need for continued progress in resource
availability, optimization, and security exists.
Our research is motivated by the increased interest in further defining and abstracting the
concept of military maneuver into the cyberspace domain along with the lack of implementation
of maneuverability into actual systems. As such, our research is focused on designing, building,
and modeling maneuverable application. We have coined the phrase ”maneuverable applications”
as being distributed and parallel systems and programs that take advantage of the modification,
relocation, addition or removal of computing resources within the application, giving the perception
of movement. These resources can be computation, network, or storage or can be the applica-
tions themselves. These actions are deliberate, purposeful and meant to achieve an advantage over
adversarial conditions. Towards this end goal, this document presents our dissertation proposal.
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1.1 Problem Statement
We present the following research question for this dissertation: How can the military
principle of maneuver be applied to computing applications in order to gain system advantages
over potential adversaries or limiting conditions?
1.2 Research Approach and Contributions
The research approach for this work is along four main avenues. The first approach is to
study resource provisioning achieved through maneuver by the designing of an application used by
students, researchers, and administrators. This system provides a big data processing platform in
academic environments. The second approach is to explore the use of maneuver for application
optimization by the building of a reconfigurable network testbed for studying the impact of physical
and logical topology on datacenter performance. The third is to investigate maneuver to achieve
a more secure computing system through the use of Petri Net models and simulation. The final
approach is the synergistic integration of the previous technologies, models and results into a pro-
totype maneuver resource manager along with the creation and discussion of best design practices
for system providers who desire to produce applications that can exist in a maneuverable context.
1.2.1 Contributions
Our contributions in the area of resource provisioning include those documented in our
paper to CLUSTER 2013 [65]. We present a platform that enables the integration of Hadoop
into an existing large scale academic computational infrastructure. This work features automated
scheduling mechanisms that facilitate an arbitrarily long run time of MapReduce applications within
the administrative constraints of a shared environment and with minimal interactions required from
system administrators. We present experimental results demonstrating that maneuvers can occur
as frequently as the average length of the reduce tasks of the executing MapReduce jobs, with only
modest impact to performance.
The contributions of our work in application optimization include those in our work at
DIDC 2014 [63]. We introduce the design and prototype development of a datacenter testbed
with a reprogrammable network topology. The testbed includes a Virtual Topology Engine that
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builds virtual network topologies over physical links with Software-defined networking flows and
a Flow Network Evaluation system to generate a network congestion estimation score. We also
present the design and development of a Hadoop shuffle traffic simulator designed to place realistic
load on a datacenter network. Our work features experimental results to show that placement of
computation racks within a datacenter topology can have significant impact of the Hadoop shuffle
traffic completion time.
Our work with modeling security improvement through maneuver contributes to the under-
standing of security in distributed applications. We present the results in our work to TRUSTCOL
2014 [62] and submitted to EAI Endorsed Transactions on Collaborative Computing [64]. We intro-
duce a Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) model of a defensive maneuver cyber platform utilizing moving
target defense and deceptive defense tactics. We analyze our SPN model to understand the trade-
offs between security and operations in defensive maneuver cyber platform. We present a robust
evaluation in the presence of an attacker and provides rules of thumb for deploying the system
to meet certain operational and security objectives. We present recommendations for how to use
and extend our current SPN model to build prototype systems implementing moving target and
deceptive defense in parallel and distributed applications.
Our work with the Prototype Resource Maneuver Manager, Fortified, is a culmination of
the previous works to build an operational maneuverable application basde on our security model-
ing. Our contributions include a fully functioning prototype software suite to deploy maneuverable
Hadoop clusters into distributed environments with individual nodes maneuvering between oper-
ational, idle, and deceptive modes of operation. Additional, Fortified provides a discrete event
simulator version of the Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform that allows long running simulations
to provide statistical analysis of the behaviors of the system. We present a validation of the math-
ematical probabilities of survival when targeted by an modeled attacker and a verification of the
security enhancements provided by moving-target and deceptive defense mechanisms.
1.2.2 Thesis Statement
By applying the concept of military maneuver to parallel and distributed computing, systems
can be built to provide resource provisioning, application optimization, and security improvement.
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1.2.3 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 covers the background information, Chapter 3
covers our work using maneuver for resource provisioning with the Job Uninterrupted Maneuverable
MapReduce Platform. Chapter 4 discusses our work in applying maneuver to provide application
optimization with the Flow Optimized Route Configuration Engine. Chapter 5 covers our modeling
of security improvement through maneuver with the Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform. Chapter
6 introduces our prototype resource maneuver manager, Fortified and its use as modeling validation




In this chapter, we provide background information on topics in military cyberspace, dis-
tributed and parallel technologies, and system modeling tools. This overview establishes foundation
for understanding the completed work and the proposed work for the dissertation research.
2.1 Military Cyberspace Doctrine
The growth of reliance on information systems and the advancement of technology has
created much research and discussion on military doctrine concerning cyberspace operations. We
discuss some of the theoretical and scientific studies in this section.
Alexander makes a case for warfighting in cyberspace and provides an overview of the
then current state of the U.S. Department of Defense’s cyber task organization [15]. He discusses
Cyberspace as a war-fighting domain and contrasts cyber operations with information operations
and electronic warfare. He argues that the U.S. must move quickly in determining the way forward
doctrinally and technically in order to stay the world leader in this field. He compares the current
environment to that of the period between World Wars when the world was struggling with how to
apply airpower in combat operations.
Many authors have focused on understanding how the principles of war are similar and
different with cyberspace and the traditional domains of warfare. Liles, et al., analyze the conven-
tions of land warfare in light of cyber warfare and its effect on command and control, information
flows and the adversary and friendly commanders [58]. He argues there is a significant disconnect
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between conventional warfare and cyberwar, especially in the laws defining what is considered an
attack and intelligence gathering. Farmer presents a thorough overview of the history of the princi-
ples of war and the foundational documents for each service in the U.S. military [35]. Additionally,
he applies cyber warfare context to all nine principles to understand if they are still valid in today’s
environment. His conclusion is they still hold true today and even offer insight into the driving
nature and future enhancement of cyber operations. Parks and Duggan find the that traditional
principles of war still apply to cyberspace operations but believe they need expanding upon and
thus have created their own “cyberwarfare principles.” They provide examples of where each tradi-
tional principle applies to cyberspace and they introduce their new principles with examples based
on their red-teaming experiences. Kallbert and Thuraisingham challenge universities to increase the
productivity of cybersecurity research in both doctrine, humanities and technology in an interdisci-
plinary approach [53]. They identify and analyze many hindrances to conducting successful research
in cyber defense and operations along with present results of a survey from recognized centers of
excellence in cyber research. Their results show a focus on information assurance and legal issues,
but few universities researching the development of offensive and defensive capabilities.
2.1.1 Cyberspace Maneuver
Though much interest in “cyberspace maneuver” exists, there has been no official definition
by the United States Department of Defense. The U.S. Military defines maneuver as “A movement to
place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy” [29]. The U.S. Army’s
definition is to “place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of
combat power” [17].
As far back as 1997, military strategists have been speculating on maneuver in an infor-
mation domain. In his Marine Corps War College thesis [83], Major Singh of the Australian Army
introduces the concept of maneuver in cyberspace operations. In the early days of the World Wide
Web and prior to the existence of military doctrine of cyberwar, Singh outlined ramifications of such
a conflict, justifications for exploration of national policies, and design of potential offensive and
defensive capabilities to operate in this space.
Applegate presents the most extensive analysis of maneuver in cyberspace operations [16].
He provides motivation for cyberspace maneuver, defines maneuver in cyberspace and provides its
characteristics. His definition is “the application of force to capture, disrupt, deny, degrade, destroy
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or manipulate computing and information resources in order to achieve a position of advantage
in respect to competitors.” Additionally he provides basic forms of offensive and defensive cyber
maneuver.
Farmer explains cyber maneuver challenges center around the constantly evolving nature of
the environment “due to technical adjustments including the addition, removal, replacement, or re-
configuration of components or networking protocols.” He demonstrates maneuver in the cyberspace
domain with examples of the 2009 undersea fiber cable cuts and the Iranian election atrocities Twit-
ter campaign. These examples show that cyberspace avenues can quickly be changed through nature
or government intervention, and that creative applications of resources can help recover from these
predicaments.
2.1.2 Moving Target Defense
Moving target defense (MTD) has recently received a great deal of attention [33, 34, 50, 51,
80, 94]. In [51], the authors address basic research challenges and how MTD can be deployed using
asymmetric cost techniques that are advantageous for the defenders and disadvantageous for the
attackers. In [34], the authors explore the effectiveness of MTD protection mechanisms. A model
for dynamic diversity defense is proposed. In [50], an OpenFlow Random Host Mutation (OF-RHM)
scheme is introduced to use OpenFlow to efficiently assign different addresses to hosts and protect
against internal and external scanning. In [33], the authors develop a Moving Target IPv6 Defense
(MT6D) that leverages the immense address space of IPv6 to hide and rotate IPv6 assignments
by implementing MT6D tunneled packets. The two goals of MT6D are to maintain user privacy
and protecting against targeted network attacks. A similar functionality in the form of a Linux
hypervisor is provided by [93]. In [80], the authors describe an approach of injecting a artificial
diversity into system for use as cyber maneuvers in a moving target defense, which employs usage
of control theoretic principles. This work discusses maneuvers including memory randomization, IP
address randomization and application of a new state machine with random extra states for protocols
such as DHCP. In [14], a concept of Random Route Mutation (RRM) is introduced and algorithms
are defined to achieve optimal path randomization between a source and a destination. In [94],
a basic design schema of a moving-target network defense system is presented and a simulation-
based study is conducted to explore the degree to which proactively changing a network’s various
parameters can decrease an adversary’s chance for success.
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2.2 Distributed and Parallel Computing Technologies
In this section, we present an overview of the distributed and parallel computing technologies
and their associated challenges. This background provides motivation for our research efforts. We
cover software-defined networking, the MapReduce programming paradigm, and scheduling systems
for cluster and shared computing resources.
2.2.1 Software-Defined Networking
Software-defined networking (SDN) technologies such as OpenFlow [60] have emerged in the
last few years as a promising new approach to operating computer networks. The seminal feature of
SDN is centralized control of packet forwarding via software controllers. Given centralized knowl-
edge of the complete network topology and traffic demand, optimizing and fault proofing of traffic
forwarding can be conveniently implemented and invoked in the SDN controllers. Unlike creation
of a new protocol or protocol stack, introduction of SDN is a change of paradigm – as its centrally
optimized and proactive control methodology presents a stark difference to today’s distributed and
reactive Internet architecture. A centralized network controller is able to programmatically modify
a switch or routers handling of traffic based on frame, packet or flow. Coupled with high speed
networking technologies (100 Gbps in the Internet core and 10 Gbps to the edge), the centralized
control methodology makes an even stronger case for achieving extremely high end-to-end networking
performance via central optimization.
Pioneering SDN research efforts explore use cases for network virtualization [82], service
insertion [6, 56, 77], load provisioning [44, 90], and network debugging [43]. Our work in Chapter
4 uses SDN technologies to maneuver the physical and logical topology of a computing cluster for
application optimization.
In the context of data-intensive computing, the most direct benefit brought by SDN is the
ability to flexibly and reliably control network bandwidth amongst compute hosts and storage [46].
The collection of the last two years’ research presented at top conferences for cluster, grid, HPC
and cloud computing have arrived at the following common conclusions: first, virtual machines
running in modern data centers are increasingly the desired vehicle for data intensive computing
due to their clean OS isolation, fast configuration, pause, migration, termination, and low setup
overhead compared to direct execution over bare metal servers [36]. Secondly, benchmark tests have
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repeatedly confirmed performance bottlenecks due to low disk I/O or network throughput instead
of processing capacity [46]. Finally, enabling virtual machines with dedicated resources, including
processor cores, storage, and network bandwidth significantly enhances performance [19].
The research trend clearly suggests that effective resource allocation in a data-intensive
distributed environment is a top priority for the community. While allocating processors for data-
intensive computing tasks using batched task schedulers is a well-learned practice, the same is
not as well understood for storage and network resources. To date, the majority of data centers
provide best-effort network throughput among processors and aggressively over-provision the raw
network bandwidth to achieve acceptable performance for users. Where high network throughput
is absolutely needed, it is offered as a premium service by placing the tasks on separate carefully
admission-controlled hardware with high-speed connectivity. This practice results in a substantial
loss of potential computing capacity and, even more crucially, severely limits HPC data centers’
ability to host time-sensitive applications. In the case of scientific workflows in such disciplines as
genomics, synthetic chemistry, atomic physics and beyond, very large data transfer is the cause for
severe bottlenecks. Today, this is addressed by custom planning and over-provisioning of networks
among dedicated HPC centers for the exact data flows expected. The approach does not scale
beyond a few heavily invested sites, such as those established for the LHC project [24]. To overcome
such limitations, methodologies for joint allocation of compute, network, and storage resources must
be studied.
2.2.2 Google MapReduce
MapReduce is a programming model for implementation for computing across large data
sets in a parallel and distributed manner. It is built upon the functional programming methods of
map and reduce. MapReduce is attractive to maneuverabilities studies due to the level of autonomy
and redundancy of the individual operations.
In 2004, Google presented their seminal work on the MapReduce Programming Model [28].
MapReduce is the parallel programming paradigm used to build the index of the World Wide Web,
which is a cornerstone in Google search. This paper provides the insight for multiple MapReduce
software suites to be built by the community.
A MapReduce job is made up of multiple map tasks and multiple reduce tasks. A mapper
takes an input set of data in a key-value pair (K,V ) and outputs an intermediate key-value pair
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(K ′, V ′). The input to the reducer is an intermediate key and the set of intermediate values for
that key (K ′, {V ′1 , V ′2 , V ′3 , ...} from all the mappers across the cluster. The reducer performs some
computation on the set of intermediate values and produces the final output value for each key
for which it was responsible for reducing. The entire possible set of intermediate key values are
partitioned and each partition is assigned to a reducer. During the shuffle phase between map
and reduce, a reducer pulls its respective partition from each mapper before beginning the reduce
computation.
2.2.3 Apache Hadoop
Hadoop MapReduce [37], the de-facto standard infrastructure support tool for MapReduce,
is a network-based parallel programming paradigm for implementing data computation over big
data using a cluster of commodity computer systems. Many industrial and governmental organiza-
tions have built large-scale production data centers with dedicated computing resources for Hadoop
clusters to support their big data and scientific computation workloads.
The network file system for the cluster is the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS). This
file system is composed of a single centralized management node, NameNode, which maintains all
the metadata for the cluster along with multiple storage nodes, DataNodes, which contain all of the
data in large block sizes (default 64 MB). Large files are divided into blocks and the data blocks are
replicated across the cluster to provide redundancy.
The MapReduce computation model includes a single central management node, JobTracker,
and multiple computation nodes, TaskTrackers. The JobTracker is responsible for delegating the
specific map and reduce task for a submitted MapReduce job to a subset of the TaskTrackers in
the cluster. The JobTracker further monitors the status of the TaskTrackers to ensure redundancy
and timely completion of the job. A single TaskTracker can be assigned both map and reduce
tasks within the same job. DataNodes and TaskTrackers exist on the same physical computing
system, thus providing the computation and storage integration that is critical to the performance
of MapReduce [37].
The JobTracker for a MapReduce cluster, in concert with the NameNode, is data locality
aware for assigning map tasks, but by default does not consider data locality for assigning reduce
tasks. Data locality awareness means the JobTracker assigns map tasks to the TaskTracker, which
is home to the input data in HDFS. This allows the computation to be executed on top of the data
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with no network transfer. As such, TaskTrackers can begin executing as soon as they are assigned
a map task. A reducing TaskTracker must wait until all mapping TaskTrackers have finished before
retrieving their input partition. Thus total execution time is affected by the last reducer to complete.
TaskTrackers are assigned reduce tasks and specific partition on a first come first serve basis, with
no consideration to map output data location.
The division of possible intermediate key values is customizable by the user on a job-by-
job basis in a MapReduce cluster. This functionality is provided by a Partitioner. The default
Partitioner for MapReduce is the HashPartitioner. The HashPartitioner applies a hash function to
the key and then computes the remainder when the number of reducers divides the hash value. This
modulus math function provides the index of the R reducer that is responsible for reducing the set
of values associated with this key. This partitioner expects a uniform distribution of keys across the
set of reducers, in theory assigning each reducer 1R of the intermediate keys. This partitioner does
not consider the size of the intermediate values that is associated with each intermediate key. The
difference between the actual measure of the partition size and the theoretical size for each reducer
is called the reducer partition skew. This skew can be due to the nature of the input values, the
intermediate key set and associated size of the intermediate values.
Hadoop is currently in version 2, which includes enhancements to HDFS and introduces
additional programming models beyond MapReduce [88]. The implementation of MapReduce in
version 2 remains consistent with the features described. Though our work in Chapter 3, 4, and 6
focuses on Hadoop v1, it can be applied to the MapReduce features of the latest version.
2.2.4 Improving Shuffle Bottleneck
In a MapReduce job, map tasks are assigned to nodes such that the input data is stored
locally. Output from map tasks must be moved across the data center network in order to reach
task nodes that preform the reduce tasks. This bulk data transfer places significant burden on data
center network and can be a major component to task completion time. The phase where output
from map tasks is transferred to reduce task is called the shuffle phase.
Two recent publications have introduced creative approaches to addressing the network
bottleneck during the shuffle phase of MapReduce jobs. The first approach integrates software
defined networking in the data center to establish fast optical circuit switched paths between racks
of mapper and racks of reducers [89]. This reconfiguration of the physical and logical paths promises
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to provide large communications channels for shuffle phase bulk data transfers. The second approach
modifies the MapReduce job’s center control node to schedule reduce tasks as close to mappers that
contribute a significant portion of the reduce task input data. [40,41]
Wang, Ng, and Shaikh [89] have proposed addressing the shuffle phase network bottleneck
by using a combination of software defined networking in a hybrid electrical optical networked data
center. The central management structure of HDFS, MapReduce, and software defined networks
promises an integration strategy to allow the network to be adapted at run-time for optimization
of big data applications. Though no actual implementation is described in the paper, they provide
theoretical results, which suggest such an approach could greatly benefit shuffle times with this
system. The results in [89] help to motivate our proposed research as described in Chapter 4.
Hammoud, Rehman, and Sakr [40, 41] suggest a different approach to limiting the impact
of data center bandwidth bottlenecks on MapReduce job performance. They address the reduce
task scheduling of a Hadoop cluster to provide data locality and data skew awareness. In native
Hadoop, data locality is afforded to map task scheduling, but not reduce task scheduling. Their
system, the Center-of-Gravity Reduce Scheduler (CoGRS), has been implemented and has shown to
reduce off-rack network traffic in their private cloud by 9.6%.
Additional research into improving Hadoop shuffle traffic has focused on the partitioning
function [49]. Many works have looked at OpenFlow enhancements for Hadoop traffic in general
[57, 68, 91]. Above and beyond Hadoop, there is increasing interest in the topology of data centers
with researchers focusing on decreasing cost, improving application performance, and lowering power
consumption. New data center topologies have been proposed [12, 13, 39, 66] while others have
proposed SDN enhancements to the flows within current topologies [92]. Finally, research is even
further growing in understanding network characteristics and optimization in production data centers
[18,20]
2.2.5 Portable Batch System
Many scheduling algorithms and systems exist to allow computing resources to be shared
between multiple user groups. Our work in Chapter 3 utilizes the Palmetto Supercomputing Cluster
at Clemson University. Our cluster uses the Portable Batch System for scheduling jobs. We provide
an overview of the PBS in this section.
The Portable Batch System, PBS, was developed by the Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation
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Facility at NASA Ames Research Center in the 1990s [45]. PBS provides an external batch scheduler
for execution of shared supercomputing resources. PBS maintains different priority job queues with
designed authorized users and hardware. This allows administrators to give some jobs to be given
preferential scheduling over other jobs and to limit the runtime of user submitted jobs. Users
submitting jobs to PBS are allowed to specify the number of computing nodes, the number of
processors, and memory needed on each computing resource, among other options.
PBS jobs can be interactive or can run in batch mode, executing designed programs or scripts
that are provided as part of the job submission. Typical parallel programming models involve the
creation of a set of parallel processes, a designated set of data, and the location for storing the
output. Jobs are submitted to a queue. When serviced the job is assigned to a set of nodes to be
executed. The user does not have to concern himself or herself with the job schedule. That is the
domain of the scheduler. While a job is running, there is the potential for the job to be preempted
by a job submitted to a queue with a higher priority that needs the preempted job‘s computing
resource.
2.2.6 Deploying Hadoop in Shared Resources
Our work in Chapter 3 applies maneuver to provision a long-running Hadoop cluster within
the administrative and financial constraints of an existing high performance computing environment.
Below we review some current approaches to deploy Hadoop within cloud, HPC, and grid systems.
A common solution to integrating Hadoop into existing HPC clusters is the use of virtual-
ization. For clusters that support virtualization interfaces, users can reserve a set of compute nodes
and set up a cluster of virtual machines (VMs) on these nodes. This provides users with an isolated
environment in which they have full root-level control over the set up of Hadoop. Notable HPC
clusters that take advantage of this approach are the FutureGrid distributed testbed [30] and the
Amazon Elastic MapReduce Cloud [1]. A drawback of this approach is the degradation in I/O per-
formance for data-intensive MapReduce applications, which has been observed on FutureGrid [54].
Another potential issue is the interaction between Hadoop and non-Hadoop jobs that are part of a
workflow using non-Hadoop software packages installed on the physical hardware.
Another approach is to dynamically set up Hadoop environments in users’ workspace. A
solution provided by Apache is the Apache Hadoop on Demand (HOD) system [4]. HOD enables
the quick provision and management of multiple Hadoop MapReduce instances on a shared clus-
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ter with PBS Torque scheduler. However, HOD requires access to a static external HDFS cluster.
The myHadoop system extends HOD by including a dynamic HDFS with user-generated Hadoop
environments [55]. This HDFS could either be placed on the local storage of the compute nodes
in non-persistent mode or on a permanent external parallel file system in persistent mode. The
approach of HOD and myHadoop enables the concurrent and isolated creation of Hadoop environ-
ments with dedicated resources through reservations. However, the implementations of HOD and
myHadoop do not allow users to automatically deal with administrative and policy issues such as
walltime limitation and priority preemption of computing resources.
Recent work focuses on creation of a new resource management mechanism that can handle
both Hadoop and non-Hadoop parallel jobs. Significant efforts include the Apache Mesos project [47]
and Apache Hadoop YARN (Yet Another Resource Negotiator) [38]. The main principle for this
approach is the separation of resource management and task scheduling mechanism in Hadoop’s
JobTracker. The new stand-alone resource manager can be used to handle both Hadoop and non-
Hadoop processes. This keeps the users from having to configure a new Hadoop environment every
time while still maintaining dynamic and isolated execution of MapReduce applications [3].
2.3 System Modeling Tools
There are many modeling techniques available to researchers including but not limited to
Markov Chain analysis and finite state automata. One very popular model that is equivalent or
includes most other models is the Petri Net. Petri Nets are uniquely suited for modeling system with
concurrent and asynchronous actions, such as distributed and parallel systems and applications [74].
Petri Nets provide a simple graphical representation that makes not only analysis but also design
of systems convenient. There are multiple automated tools and solvers available to analyze Petri
Nets [31]. Additionally, many cybersecurity systems have been modeled with Petri Nets in the
literature.
2.3.1 Petri Nets
Petri Nets were created by Carl Adam Petri [67] as a method to study concurrency in
parallel and distributed applications. Petri Nets have been applied in many disciplines and extended
in multiple facets through the years. Petri Nets are found in use within the computer science field
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to model of a distributed computing system in which to study the correctness, concurrency, and
synchronization.
A Petri Net is a bipartite, weighted, directed graph composed of two types of nodes called
Places and Transitions and edges called Arcs. Places represent preconditions or values of variables
in the system and are designated as circles graphically. Transitions represent actions taken as a
result of valid preconditions or values and are represented as rectangles or lines. Since the graph is
bi-partite, arcs only exist between places and transitions. There are no arcs between two places or
two transitions. Places from which an arc originates are considered input places to the transitions
in which the arc terminates. Places in which arcs terminate are considered output places of the
transition at the origin of the arc. Tokens, represented by solid dots, indicate preconditions being
true or values of variables. Multiple Tokens can be found in places throughout a net. The distribution
of tokens over a net represents the configuration of the system and is called the marking. Arcs have
weights that represent the number of tokens consumed or produces as a result of transitions “firing”.
When a transition “fires” tokens from its input places are consumed and tokens are produced in the
output places. Transition can only fire when enabled, meaning all input places have the minimum
number of required tokens. Transition firings are atomic and nondeterministic. Multiple transitions
could be enabled concurrently, but the order in which the fire is not known and the result of a
transition firing can result enable or disable other transitions.
A basic Petri Net with four places and two transitions is show Figure 2.1. In the current
marking of this Petri Net, P0 has two tokens, P1 and P2 each have one token, and P3 has no tokens.
The weight of two on the arc from P0 to T0 indicates that two tokens in P0 must be present for
T0 to be enabled to fire. The weight of 2 on the arc from T1 to P3 indicates that if T1 fires that it
will place two additional tokens in P3. These tokens are added to any tokens that may already be
present in P3.
A marking of a Petri Net is indicated as M which is a vector of length m which is the
number of places in Petri Net. Each value of mi represents the number of token present in the ith
place. Each Petri Net has an initial marking, M0, which describes the initial state of the system.
A marking, M ′, is said to be reachable if a series of valid transition firings from M0 results in M ′.
A way to visualize all reachable states is to create a reachability graph that shows all reachable
markings and the transition firing sequence to each state. This graph shows the entire state space
for a Petri Net. The reachability graph for the basic Petri Net presented above is shown in Figure
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Figure 2.1: A basic Petri Net with four places, two transitions and four arcs.
Figure 2.2: Reachability Graph for basic Petri Net in Figure 2.1.
2.2.
2.3.2 Stochastic Petri Nets
Multiple extensions of the basic Petri Net can be found in throughout the literature [52,75].
One such extension, is the Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) [11] where transitions have a delay between
enabling and firing. This delay is recalculated each time the transition becomes enabled and has
an exponential distribution where each transition is assigned its own firing rate. When multiple
transitions are enabled, the transition with the shortest delay time will fire first. Graphically, the
timed transitions are shown as unfilled rectangles, as opposed to solid rectangles or straight lines
which are immediate transitions in the standard Petri Net. Figure 2.3 shows a sample SPN with
firing rates (λ0, λ1, λ2).
An SPN in which the number of tokens in a place is finite has been shown to be equivalent
to a finite Markov Chain. The Markov Chain can be determined from the reachability graph of
the SPN and the initial marking. This makes it possible to solve the steady-state distribution of
the SPN. This steady-state distribution allows one to analyze systems described as stochastic Petri
Nets to determine probability of the system existing in a given state. Table 2.1 formally describes
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Figure 2.3: A Stochastic Petri Net with firing rates for each transition shown
a Stochastic Petri Net as a 6-tuple PN .
Table 2.1: Formal Definition of Stochastic Petri Net
SPN = (P, T,R, I,W,M0)
P = {p0, p1, ..., pm} is a finite set of places,
T = {t0, t1, ..., tn} is a finite set of transitions,
P ∩ T = ∅,
λ = {λ0, λ1, ...λn} is the set of transitions firing rates,
I = I− ∪ I+
I− ⊆ (P × T ) and I+ ⊆ (T × P ) are a sets of input and output arcs,
W : I → {1, 2, 3, ...} is a weight function
Mo : P → {0, 1, 2, 3, ...} is the initial marking.
2.3.3 Platform Independent Petri Net Editor (PIPE2)
The Platform Independent Petri Net Editor (PIPE2) [31] began as a graduate course group
project at the University of London in 2003. The goal of the project was to design an application
that allows Petri Nets to be designed graphically and analyzed.
PIPE2 is written in Java and compatible with any OS capable of running Java programs.
The system provides the capability to create standard Petri Nets and Stochastic Petri Net models.
The tool allows a user to draw a SPN using drag-and-drop tools on a canvas, then to save the file
in an XML file that can be opened in other applications. The tool also has the ability to animate
the model with random firing of transitions or interactive user manipulations. The key aspect of
the tool is the wide variety of analysis modules and the ability for users to design and integrate
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their own custom modules. One such module is the Steady State Analysis. This module determines
reachability graph of a SPN then calculates the steady state distribution. We use this module in
our analysis in Chapter 5.
2.3.4 Petri Nets for Security Modeling
Some research efforts have been devoted to security modeling and analysis using SPN [25,
27, 86]. In [27], an approach using generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPNs) to model and analyze
attack trees is proposed with the ultimate goal of automating the analysis using simulation tools.
The results of this simulation and analysis can then be used to further refine the attack tree or to
develop corresponding countermeasures. In [86], a vulnerability assessment framework is proposed
to systematically evaluate the vulnerabilities of SCADA systems at three levels: system, scenarios,
and access points using a generalized stochastic Petri net model. The proposed method is based on
cyber systems embedded with the firewall and password models, the primary mode of protection in
the power industry. In [25], the authors investigated the use of Petri nets for modeling coordinated
cyber-physical attacks on the smart grid. A hierarchical method is provided to construct large Petri
nets from a number of smaller Petri nets that can be created separately by different domain experts
for analyzing cyber-physical attacks.
2.3.5 Other Maneuverable Projects
Research investigating applications having maneuvering characteristics have been funded by
the U.S. government and can be found in the literature. These works concentrate on single node ap-
plications, where our work concentrates on parallel and distributed applications. Additionally, these
works focus on providing secure environments only, where we extend the idea of maneuverability
into the realms of resource provisioning and application optimization.
Raytheon’s Net Maneuver Commander (NMC) [21,22] is a prototype command and control
system enhanced by moving target defense. NMC inserts randomness into hardware platforms,
operating systems, and network segments to move network-based elements increasing resiliency.
The system has been used to maneuver military command and control systems, databases, and
network services such as DNS, DHCP, web proxies, and VOIP servers. Additionally, they provide a
honey net implementation that moves previously used nodes into a monitored and controlled network
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segment for isolation and identification of potential attackers.
Their work presents an overview of their motivations and architecture. They present an-
alytic results of simulated force-on-force interactions. By introducing an analysis framework [42]
and metrics to provide feedback and measurement of the improved resiliency of the environment,
they show the NMC does lower the percentage of successful attacks and increase the time to com-
plete successfully attacks. Finally, they present recommendations on how to expand the work and
deploying the system in production environments.
Lincoln Laboratory’s Trusted Dynamic Logical Heterogeneity System (TALENT) [71] is a
framework for live migration of applications across a set of heterogenous systems. TALENT by
utilizing systems with different instruction sets and operating systems increases the dynamic attack
surface of the critical application. TALENT implements portable checkpoints and operating system
level virtualization migration to achieve maneuver of critical systems, prioritizes mission success over
individual system stability. By preserving internal state of an application, TALENT can migrate
entire environments including but not limited to virtual networking, open file handles, transferring
buffers, and signals. TALENT does not contain threat detection mechanism to trigger migrations,
only randomized movements.
Both, NMC and TALENT, differ from our proposed work with the Defensive Maneuver
Cyber Platform in that we are focused on a distributed and parallel application where individual
nodes maneuver between active, idle or deceptive membership. We also are explicitly modeling
a system in search of analytical findings of increased survivability in the presence of attackers.
Additionally, our work utilizes deception as a feedback mechanism to understanding the threat
conditions and adapting the system at run time relative to the conditions.
Our work also differed from NMC and TALENT by using maneuver for resource provisioning
and application optimizing. Many research efforts have focused on relating cyber maneuver to only
moving target defense and cybersecurity efforts, where we have shown maneuver can be employed
for additional system advantages.
2.3.6 Summary
This chapter presents a survey of background information in use by our completed work
and our proposed work. Specifically, we review military cyberspace issues and research, distributed





The first area of interest for studying maneuver in cyberspace platforms is in the area of
resource provisioning. Our work with the Job Uninterrupted Maneuverable MapReduce Platform
shows how we can provision a big data environment in a university setting within the current
investment of high performance computing. This is achieved by the use of maneuvering of nodes in
and out of the cluster.
JUMMP, the Job Uninterrupted Maneuverable MapReduce Platform [65] is an automated
scheduling platform that provides a customized Hadoop system within a batch-scheduled cluster
environment. JUMMP enables an interactive pseudo-persistent MapReduce platform within the
existing administrative structure of an academic high performance computing center by “jumping”
between nodes with minimal administrative effort. Jumping is implemented by the synchronization
of stopping and starting daemon processes on different nodes in the cluster. Our experimental
evaluation shows that JUMMP can be as efficient as a persistent Hadoop cluster on dedicated
computing resources, depending on the jump time. Additionally, we show that the cluster remains
stable, with good performance, in the presence of jumps that occur as frequently as the average length
of reduce tasks of the currently executing MapReduce job. JUMMP provides an attractive solution
to academic institutions that desire to integrate Hadoop into their current computing environment
within their financial, technical, and administrative constraints.
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3.1 Introduction
This rapid evolution and adoption of Hadoop has created a rich and complex software
ecosystem [61]. This introduces challenges to system administrators in offering this service while
maintaining a stable production environment. This is especially challenging in a typical centralized
academic research environment where the hardware and software infrastructures are designed to
accommodate a wide variety of research applications within a set of financial, technical, and admin-
istrative constraints. To address this problem, we introduce the Job Uninterrupted Maneuverable
MapReduce Platform. JUMMP is an automated scheduling platform that enables the integration of
Hadoop into the existing large scale computational infrastructure to support high availability and
continuous computing for research and education.
The strength of Hadoop comes from its design characteristics that bring computation to
data stored on large local hard drives to take advantage of data locality instead of having to transfer
data across the network, and to guarantee job completion in the event of frequent failures. This
comes at a cost of extra computing cycles due to additional communication and metadata overhead
to support very large scale transparent parallelization [73]. As a result, a typical Hadoop cluster
consists of computing nodes with multiple terabyte-sized local storage [48]. Standard practice for
architectural design of centralized, shared academic research environments usually places the com-
puting components and the storage components into separate clusters. The local storage on the
computing components is temporary and measured in just a few hundreds of gigabytes. Provision-
ing Hadoop as a separate stand-alone cluster requires the additional acquisition of new hardware,
new rack placements, and additional power and cooling cost. On the other hand, the setup of a
dynamic Hadoop environment is limited to standard resource scheduling policies in a shared com-
puting environment. Examples of such policies are the maximum number of resources that can be
reserved, or the maximum amount of time that a computing node can be reserved. This places a
limit on the capability of Hadoop-based programs within such an environment.
Our work with the Job Uninterrupted Maneuverable MapReduce Platform provides the
following contributions:
• A platform that enables the integration of Hadoop into an existing large scale academic com-
putational infrastructure,
• Automated scheduling mechanisms that facilitate an arbitrarily long run time of MapReduce
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applications within the administrative constraints of a shared environment and with minimal
interactions required from system administrators, and
• Experimental results that demonstrate that jumps can occur as frequently as the average length
of the reduce tasks of the executing MapReduce jobs, with only modest impact to performance.
3.2 Motivation
In this section, we describe user and environmental considerations that motivate the JUMMP
implementation. These considerations are observed in the typical shared high performance comput-
ing environment found in academic institutions.
3.2.1 User Considerations
In an academic environment, we can classify the usage of Hadoop into three different cate-
gories. The first category includes research applications that use Hadoop MapReduce as a tool for
research purposes. These projects can either use MapReduce programs exclusively or use MapRe-
duce programs as part of a larger workflow in a programming framework. The researchers may
spend some time developing MapReduce programs and other necessary components and then focus
on executing the programs to achieve the final results. As these are research applications, researchers
are typically alternating between running the computations and analyzing the produced outputs.
The second category is the study of the Hadoop MapReduce ecosystem itself. This includes
studies of Hadoop MapReduce under different hardware and software configurations, development of
improvements to Hadoop MapReduce, and implementations of different alternative parallel frame-
works to Hadoop MapReduce. While these projects do not usually use as many computing hours as
the first category, they need to frequently test different setups of the Hadoop cluster for performance
analysis purposes. This testing of dynamic execution environments for Hadoop is difficult to do in
most dedicated production facilities.
The third category includes small projects such as those submitted by students doing course
projects. While these projects usually have short run times and use small data, the nature of the
students’ behavior can lead to unintended issues. In our experiences teaching Hadoop MapReduce
during the Fall 2012 and Spring 2013 semesters, we observed multiple problems, such as crashing of
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(a) A typical HPC cluster with compute nodes
separated from storage nodes
(b) A Hadoop cluster with storage on the com-
pute nodes for data locality
Figure 3.1: Comparing a design choice for computing and storage placement between typical HPC
cluster and Hadoop cluster
the Hadoop MapReduce core processes, corruption of data on the cluster’s HDFS, and overloading
of the cluster as students rush to complete the work before deadlines.
With these categories, we have the following design objectives:
• Support guaranteed execution of MapReduce programs until completion regardless of run time
(currently, there is no check-pointing mechanism for MapReduce jobs),
• Allow reconfiguration of Hadoop environment settings such as block size, number of map tasks,
and number of reduce tasks, for different performance evaluation experiments,
• Facilitate isolated execution of MapReduce programs, and
• Support rapid movement to different hardware when impending failures are detected on current
hardware.
3.2.2 Environment Considerations
While considering the needs of the users, we also seek to address other constraints of a
typical academic high performance computing environment. The first constraint is cost. The costs
of purchasing new computing hardware, building new floor space, and maintaining power make it
difficult for many academic computing centers to provision dedicated resources for Hadoop.
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A second constraint is the difference in technology between Hadoop MapReduce and a typical
high performance computing cluster. Standard accepted practice for building high performance
computing clusters (HPC) is to separate compute nodes from storage nodes. The compute nodes
handle CPU-intensive parts of parallel applications while the storage nodes handle I/O demands
of the applications, typically through a parallel file system [81]. Parallelization mechanisms are
facilitated by specialized libraries at run time (e.g. MPI libraries for C-based applications), and
data movement between computation and storage is done through a high-speed interconnect. While
Hadoop MapReduce also relies on specialized libraries to facilitate parallelism, its performance comes
from the data locality enabled by the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS). HDFS divides data
files into equally sized blocks and stores them on the local hard disks of compute nodes. Instead of
transferring data through the network, the computation processes are spawned locally and assigned
to individual blocks. This difference in computation and storage placement is illustrated in Figure
3.1.
A third constraint is the support of the run time environment of Hadoop. Hadoop maintains
two permanent Java daemon processes, called the DataNode and the Task Tracker. These process
are on all of the compute nodes at all times in order to handle both HDFS and MapReduce. The
continuous execution of dedicated persistent Java virtual machines makes Hadoop unsuited for a
centralized installation on an HPC cluster where users also frequently run non-Hadoop applications.
Our approach is to provision Hadoop as a dynamic execution environment that can be
set up, executed, and shut down on demand by a user. This is feasible from user space since
Hadoop’s core Java processes do not require any root-level privileges to execute and communicate.
However, scheduling dynamic setups of Hadoop environments creates overhead due to run-time
configuration, data staging, output write, and shutdown of the environment. Related work shows
that for data-intensive applications, the total overhead could be as high as the execution time
itself [55]. To make dynamic provisioning effective, there must be a mechanism that allows dynamic
Hadoop environments to reserve the resources beyond the standard policy of per-user limits in a
semi-persistent manner during the computation phases of application execution. An obvious solution
to this problem, permanently assigning a set of compute nodes to specific users, places additional
responsibilities on the administrators such as how to set a scheduling policy for users who want to
execute both Hadoop and non-Hadoop applications, and how to make sure that the allocations of
computing resources are fair.
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Our goal is to facilitate the setup of user-controlled dynamic Hadoop environments that
execute within existing scheduling policies including resource limitation, maximum walltime, and
priority preemption, without administrative intervention.
3.3 Architecture
3.3.1 JUMMP Design
JUMMP is designed to operate within the Palmetto High Performance Computing Cluster
at Clemson University [7] using the PBS Professional scheduler, although the system can easily be
adapted to use with other schedulers. Hadoop version 1.1.2 is used in our system. Any 1.x version can
be used. The Hadoop cluster uses a single dedicated node for both the NameNode and JobTracker.
This dedicated node resides outside the control of the scheduler. Each DataNode/TaskTracker is
scheduled as an individual PBS job, which allows for preemption or failure of a PBS job to only
affect a single node of the Hadoop Cluster.
The design choice to use a dedicated persistent node as the master of the Hadoop cluster is
based on an assumption that securing a single node for dedicated use from an HPC administrator is
more achievable than securing all the nodes required for the cluster. Also, the transition of the head
node of an active Hadoop cluster during the middle of a MapReduce job is technically more difficult
than the transition of the slave nodes. Including the JobTracker and name node in the maneuvering
portion of the cluster is a topic for future work.
Each DataNode and TaskTracker is established within its own PBS job. The PBS job starts
the Hadoop daemons and connects them to the persistent head node. Each daemon waits for its
trigger to jump. When the trigger to jump is received (PBS preemption or expiration of the jump
timer), the PBS job schedules its replacement PBS job. Next, the DataNode decommissions itself
from the name node and the TaskTracker blacklists itself from the JobTracker. Finally, the Hadoop
daemons are stopped and the PBS job completes. The newly spawned replacement node repeats
this process.
When notified of an upcoming jump of a slave node, the name node begins to reassign the
blocks replicated on the outgoing node to the remaining nodes in the cluster. The incoming node
receives a subset of the blocks its previous node possessed. The JobTracker immediately kills any
task assigned to the outgoing TaskTracker and reassigns those tasks to available TaskTrackers.
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In our earlier implementations of JUMMP, we stopped the TaskTracker daemons without
notifying the JobTracker. After the standard heartbeat failure timeout, tasks would then be re-
assigned. This behavior greatly degraded performance. The proactive measure of blacklisting the
TaskTracker allows the JUMMP to transition much faster.
JUMMP is implemented using a combination of Bash and Python scripts to control ex-
ecution of the daemons, logging of actions, and trapping of signals to ensure the rescheduling of
replacement nodes during jumps.
We describe the configuration of the JUMMP with the following variables:
• The number of DataNodes and TaskTrackers in the system is n.
• The scheduled time between node jumps is tj .
When the JUMMP system is initialized, the user is able to specify n and tj . After a
stabilization period, a single node lives for ntj minutes. A node jumps somewhere in the cluster
every tj minutes.
In the event of a jump caused by an PBS scheduler preemption, the jumping node could
alert its new node of the remaining time until the regularly scheduled jump, thus allowing the timing
of the cluster transitions to be resumed. This topic is an area of future work.
The flexible and maneuverable design of JUMMP allows us to support our user consider-
ations as presented above. While allowing preempted or failed nodes to submit PBS jobs for their
replacement, we have guaranteed survival of the Hadoop cluster and continuation of running jobs
until completion. Since each instantiation of JUMMP specifies a Hadoop directory with executables
and configurations, users are able to tailor their JUMMP instance to the needs of their long running
Hadoop environment on an isolated set of nodes within the shared cluster environment. Lastly, ad-
ministrators can “blacklist” nodes that are experiencing prolonged failure or which have upcoming
maintenance. Blacklisted nodes are not listed as available resources for the scheduler, thus allowing
JUMMP to avoid and maneuver around those resources to more suitable hardware.
3.4 Experiment
Adding maneuverability to a Hadoop cluster incurs some degradation of performance. We
attempt to evaluate this degradation to understand the trade-offs of such a system and to estimate
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the rate at which a jump could efficiently occur. With each jump of a DataNode, additional over-
head is occurred over a non-jumping cluster. This overhead comes from two separate sources: the
scheduler overhead and replication of HDFS blocks. As previously mentioned, JUMMP schedules
each DataNode and TaskTracker as separately scheduled jobs within the supercomputing environ-
ment. Scheduling and queuing delays results in fewer TaskTrackers being available to perform map
and reduce tasks. We refer to the JUMMP as being “undersized” during the time when a node
is awaiting the scheduler to place the slave node on an available node in the datacenter. Once an
existing DataNode leaves the cluster, all blocks that were stored on its local storage must be repli-
cated across the cluster. The NameNode begins this immediately upon the decommissioning of the
outgoing node. This data replication consumes processing, network bandwidth, and disk drive seeks
that normally would be used for computation for the currently running MapReduce job.
3.4.1 Design
In order to capture, measure and quantify this degradation, we conducted two separate
experiments on the performance of JUMMP on the Palmetto High Performance Computer Cluster.
In each experiment, we establish a baseline performance metric for a stationary Hadoop cluster by
repeatedly running the same MapReduce job 100 times over a static dataset. We rerun the job three
additional times while varying the jump time for the cluster. We record the times of the jumps, the
individual task start and stop times, and the overall job run time. With these results we quantify
the overhead of jumping during the execution of a MapReduce job.
We ran our experiments on a homogeneous set of nodes within Palmetto to ensure uniformity
of test results. All tests are run on an isolated pool of 96 nodes for DataNodes and TaskTrackers.
The hardware of these nodes is shown in Table 3.1. A datablock size of 256 MB is used throughout
the experiments and each TaskTracker has 8 map task slots and 4 reduce task slots. 2GB of memory
is allocated for each task. At the allocation of the initial nodes and creation of the JUMMP, the
dataset for the experiment is imported, the nodes start jumping, and the MapReduce job begins to
run.
For our experiments, we use the dataset and benchmarks from PUMA, Purdue’s MapRe-
duce Benchmark Suite [10]. PUMA is developed as a benchmark suite to represent a broad range
of MapReduce applications exhibiting application characteristics with high/low computation and
high/low shuffle volumes. The parameters of our two experiment runs are shown in Table 3.2. The
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Node HP SL250s
CPU Intel Xeon E5-2665 (2)
Cores 16
Memory 64 GB
Local Storage Capacity 900 GB
Networking Infiniband
Table 3.1: Node Configuration
Application Wordcount Terasort
Dataset Size 50 GB 300 GB
Node Count 8 32
Jump Times [mins] 7/10/15 20/40/60
Table 3.2: Experiment Parameters
jump times are calculated based on the average running time of the baseline MapReduce job. Jump
times are configured to jump during every second, third, and fourth job runs.
3.5 Analysis
3.5.1 Characteristics of the Impact
Whenever an active TaskTracker jumps, all tasks currently executing and some previously
completed tasks have to be rerun. Since all reduce tasks must retrieve their partition of intermediate
data from all map tasks, any map task previously completed by a jumping TaskTracker have to
be rerun if all reduce tasks have not finished the shuffling phase. Furthermore, any reduce tasks
being executed by the jumping TaskTracker have to be reassigned and rerun. If any reduce task is
restarted, then then the map task whose intermediate data is unavailable also have to be rerun. This
re-execution of in-progress and completed tasks adds delay and overhead into the overall execution
of the MapReduce job.
This restarting overhead is visualized in Figure 3.2. Figures (a) and (d) show a typical
execution of the wordcount and terasort experiments in the absence of a node jump. The charts
plot the number of currently executing tasks, grouped by type, during the time of the job execution.
The job starts with multiple map tasks conducted in parallel. Once the first set of map tasks
completes, the shuffle phase of the first set of reduce tasks begins downloading their partitions of the
intermediate data from the completed map tasks. This process continues until all map tasks have
completed and the shuffling is done, at which time the reduce actions begin. The reducing continues
until all reduce tasks have completed and the output is written to HDFS.
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(a) No jump during wordcount execution(b) Jump during map phase of wordcount
execution
(c) Jump during reduce phase of word-
count execution
(d) No jump during terasort execution (e) Jump during map phase of terasort
execution
(f) Jump during reduce phase of terasort
execution
Figure 3.2: MapReduce job task execution during jump
Figure 3.2 (b) and (e) present the cost of jumps occurring before all the mapping and
shuffling phases have completed. In these examples, a spike in the number of map tasks at the
time of the jump (indicated by dashed vertical lines) shows that additional mapping and shuffling
acitivities are performed due to the loss of work from the jumped tasktracker (shown in yellow). The
intermediate data from the map tasks completed by the jumping TaskTracker is no longer available
for the future reduce tasks and thus that work must be repeated. As illustrated in Figures 3.2 (c)
and (f), when jumps occur during the reduce phase, map tasks must be re-executed and reduce tasks
must begin shuffling intermediate data to complete the MapReduce job.
3.5.2 Performance Measurements
There are two important measures in understanding the performance of a jumping cluster.
The first measure, the “effort” overhead, is the overhead of work that must be re-executed because
of a jump. The second measure, “performance” overhead, is the additional wall-time needed to
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complete the job. We record the performance of our experiments and present the results with a
focus on these two measures in this section.
Observing the information shown in Figure 3.2, we calculate the effort overhead as the area
of the jumped map and reduce tasks. This extra computation is wasted since it must be repeated
after the jump. We can quantify taskseconds for all phases of the job by taking the area under the
curve of each type of task.
The mean taskseconds for each cluster for both the wordcount and terasort applications are
shown in Figure 3.3. Tasks that are executed by a node that is jumping during the job execution
are refered to as “doomed” since they are lost and re-executed. The results are interesting in that
they show the doomed reduced tasks incurr no additional taskseconds than the Hadoop normal
effort overhead of speculative execution of straggler reduce tasks. Furthermore, in both cases of (a)
wordcount and (b) terasort, the doomed map taskseconds increase as jump times decrease, but this
effort overhead is still two orders of magnitude less than the taskseconds of the successful map tasks.
(a) Wordcount TaskSecond Averages (b) Terasort TaskSecond Averages
Figure 3.3: Map, shuffle and reduce taskseconds and doomed map and reduce tasks for wordcount
and terasort jobs under various jump times
The running times of the MapReduce jobs themselves are extracted from the normal logging
system of Hadoop. Since our experiments use the same job running on the same static dataset, we
have control over many variables that affect the run time of MapReduce jobs. Those variables that
are outside of our control are locations on disk where intermediate values and reduce outputs are
written, network traffic from adjacent nodes not part of the Hadoop cluster, and variations in task
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(a) Wordcount Map Task Time CDF (b) Terasort Map Task Run Time CDF
Figure 3.4: CDF of Map Task times for WordCount and TeraSort
scheduling from the JobTracker.
The map task run time cumulative distribution function (CDF) in Figure 3.4 for both the
(a) wordcount and (b) terasort jobs show that jumping has minimal impact on the map task time.
This is due to the fact that the system only reports the time for the successful attempt of each map
task. For instance, in the case of the wordcount experiment, there are 200 HDFS blocks on which
map tasks are placed. If there is a 50% failure rate on map tasks, the time spent during those failed
attempts for the 100 map tasks would not be included in the time to complete those tasks. As such,
viewing the map task time does not help to show the imposed overhead of a jumping node. That is
where information in Figure 3.3 is more relevant.
The job run time CDFs in Figure 3.5 for both (a) wordcount and (b) terasort jobs show
the expected behavior of longer run times as the frequency of the jumps increase. Each jump time
plot is observed to follow the non-jumping plot up until the point where it reaches the percentage
of jobs that are under jump conditions. This is directly related to the ratio of average run time
and the jump time for the cluster. For instance, the wordcount job, when not jumping, has an
average run time of 3 minutes. When jumping every 7 minutes, 60% of the jobs are unaffected by a
jump. Observing the CDF plot shows that the slope of the plot is near vertical up to 60% and the
remaining 40% begins to flatten as overhead is observed.
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(a) Wordcount Job Run Time CDF (b) Terasort Job Run Time CDF
Figure 3.5: CDF of Job times for WordCount and TeraSort
3.5.3 Optimizing Jump Time
Due to the observed overhead of JUMMP, a very short jump time is not preferred for a
maneuverable Hadoop cluster. As the cluster’ size increases and reservation window decreases, it
becomes necessary for JUMMP to be configured such that a node jumps before the expiration of
its reservation window. An optimal jump time is one that minimizes the overhead of the jumps but
also allows the size of the cluster to be maximized for improving parallel processing. Equation 3.1
shows the derivation of the maximum time to jump (tj) based on reservation window (RESV ) and
size of the cluster (n).
n× tj ≤ RESV
tj ≤ RESVn
(3.1)
Characteristics of the behavior of Hadoop also contribute to the calculation of the minimal
jump time. These factors involve data replication speeds and MapReduce job execution timing. We
look at each of these individually to discuss how they contribute to minimizing the jump time.
The default replication factor in Hadoop is three. This means that a data block exists within
the local storage of three DataNodes. This is configurable by the cluster administrator at start up
or on a case-by-case basis when data is written into HDFS. When the NameNode detects a block
is under-replicated, it assigns another replication to be stored throughout the cluster. JUMMP
initiates this replication pro-actively when a jumping node decommissions itself from the Hadoop
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cluster, as previously mentioned. If the jump time is so small that nodes are jumping faster than
the blocks can be replicated, the JUMMP could become unstable due to missing blocks. The speed
at which data is replicated is related to average number of blocks on the node, the speed of the
network interconnect, and the workload of the NameNode to reassign block locations. Calculating
the minimum jump time as related to data replication is an area of future work.
Finally, optimal jump time is tied to the timing of the currently executing MapReduce job.
As shown in Figure 3.2, when a TaskTracker jumps, its currently executing and previously completed
tasks in the running MapReduce jobs must be reassigned. The biggest impact is observed when a
TaskTracker with an active reduce task jumps. This causes the reduce task to start over and have
any unavailable map intermediate data to be recalculated. If nodes are jumping so frequently as to
never allow a rescheduled reducer to complete execution, then JUMMP becomes unstable and jobs
are interrupted. We thus find that the cluster remains stable in the present of jumps as frequent as
the average execution time of the reduce tasks of the currently executing MapReduce job.
3.6 Discussion
In our first research approach to investigating maneuver for resource provisioning, we have
presented the Job Uninterrupted Maneuverable MapReduce Platform. JUMMP is an automated
scheduling platform that provides a customized Hadoop environment within a batch-scheduled clus-
ter environment. Through its design and redundant nature, JUMMP enables an interactive pseudo-
persistent MapReduce platform within the existing administrative structure of an academic high
performance computing center. Our experimental evaluation shows that JUMMP can be as efficient
as a persistent Hadoop cluster on dedicated computing resources, depending on the jump time. Ad-
ditionally, we show that the cluster remains stable, with good performance, in the presence of jumps






Our second area of interest for maneuverabilty in cyberspace systems is application opti-
mization. Our research with the Flow Optimized Route Configuration Engine (FORCE) investigates
this enhancement. This is an instrumented, representative network testbed where the network topol-
ogy of a cluster can be maneuvered to develop novel approaches to optimize traffic flow and timing
for a datacenter traffic.
The Flow Optimized Route Configuration Engine (FORCE) [63] is an emulated datacenter
testbed with a programmable interconnection controlled by an SDN controller. Software-defined
networking (SDN) combined with distributed and parallel applications has the potential to deliver
optimized application performance at runtime. In order to investigate this enhancement and design
future implementation, a datacenter with a programmable topology integrated with application state
is needed. The FORCE proceeds us down the path towards this goal. We also utilize Hadoop as
a case study of distributed and parallel applications along with a simulated Hadoop shuffle traffic
generator. The testbed provides initial experimental evidence of support to our hypothesis for future
SDN research. Our experiments on the testbed show a difference in application runtime a factor of
over 2.5 times on shuffle traffic for Hadoop MapReduce jobs and the potential for significant speedup
in warehouse scale data centers.
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4.1 Introduction
Software-defined networking (SDN) combined with distributed and parallel applications
has the potential to deliver optimized application performance at runtime. In order to investigate
this enhancement and design future implementation, a datacenter with a programmable topology
integrated with application state is needed.
Much potential exists in the integration of SDN technologies and performance optimization
of distributed and parallel applications within a datacenter. Building entirely new experimental data
centers or modifying existing production data centers to study this investigation is costly in time,
dollars, and operational output. Historically, researchers have used testbeds or controlled infrastruc-
ture to experiment with information technology systems resembling real systems and networks. This
approach is advantageous to the SDN and datacenter researcher and can provide significant gains if
establish with realistic conditions and instrumented to give constant, measurable results. Our results
are the first step to provide a capability that leads to a roadmap for developing methodologies to
study this integration.
The contributions of this work include the following:
• The design and prototype development of a datacenter testbed with a reprogrammable network
topology. The testbed includes a Virtual Topology Engine that builds virtual network topolo-
gies over physical links with SDN flows and a Flow Network Evaluation system to generate a
network congestion estimation score.
• The design and development of a Hadoop shuffle traffic simulator designed to place realistic
load on a datacenter network.
• Experimental results to show that placement of computation racks within a datacenter topology
can have significant impact of the Hadoop shuffle traffic completion time.
4.2 Motivation
In this section, we describe our motivations and goals for the research infrastructure testbed,
which includes the enabling capabilities of software-defined networking. Our overall research goal
is to investigate technologies and methods for optimizing the performance and energy efficiency
of parallel and distributed applications in a cluster or cloud environment. Our goals include the
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study of how the performance of distributed applications is impacted by the network topology
of the datacenter [89]. Analytic and simulation performance models often do not capture all of
the characteristics of real applications in a complex distributed environment. At the same time,
experimenting with real systems and manipulation of real datacenter topologies can be very expensive
in time and dollars. It is not practical to reconfigure an academic production datacenter topology
for experimental studies, for example. However, SDN is a technology that can be used to easily
and temporarily reconfigure physical and virtual network topologies. Our testbed is a low-cost
experimental platform that uses a networked set of single computers and virtualization to emulate
the performance of whole racks of machines in a datacenter and their applications. The testbed
provides an SDN infrastructure that can be used to study how changes in network topology can
impact the performance of the applications.
Several research goals lead us to the integration of SDN and parallel and distributed ap-
plications. First, we desire to build a low-cost reconfigurable testbed. We use a modest number
of workstations and custom software to emulate the behavior of the entire datacenter. Secondly,
we strive to use the testbed to study the effects of network topologies on distributed applications.
Our testbed is configured with SDN hardware. Our research goals include using the testbed to
gain insight and an early indication of which hypotheses of the use of SDN are worthy of further
investigation. Lastly, we would like to understand how execution time modifications of the topology
of the datacenter can be used to optimize application performance.
The relationship between network throughput and performance in the Hadoop distributed
computing platform has been studied in the literature. Network congestion can delay the movement
of data between compute nodes in the shuffle phase of a MapReduce job as reduce tasks fetch data
from completed map tasks [89]. These delays can cause overall performance degradation as well as
straggler tasks that lengthen the total run time and overuse the available task slots [28]. Network
performance also affects operations in the cluster’s underlying distributed file system, such as data
replication in HDFS [85] and bulk transfers in OrangeFS/PVFS [78].
Congestion in the network can arise for several reasons, such as inadequate provisioning
of overall network resources or imbalance in the application workload. Congestion can also occur
because of suboptimal decisions or lack of adaptivity in the allocation of the available network re-
sources. In typical cluster configurations, multiple paths exist between any two nodes. Although
network switches incorporate forwarding algorithms that attempt to balance traffic across multiple
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paths, legacy load-balancing algorithms on switching hardware spread traffic based on hashing the
source and destination address and protocol [69]. This limits coexistent flows’ ability to leverage
available capacity in the data center network, causing congestion even when there is available band-
width in an alternate path. For short flow applications such as MPI the performance can be more
sensitive to latency than throughput and the existing mechanisms for network configuration and
adaptation may often be adequate. However, in data-intensive applications such as MapReduce
and its supporting file systems the workload tends to pass data in very long flows. These types
of applications are more tolerant of latency and the predominant limiting factor in performance is
throughput. In these cases the performance can be improved by execution time network allocation
decisions that are enabled through heightened visibility and maneuverability of the network.
SDN allows a operator-managed controller such as Floodlight [8] with a high level view
of the network to remotely program network switches through a protocol such as OpenFlow [60].
The controller is capable of programming its associated switches either reactively or proactively. In
the reactive case, a switch receiving a packet for which it has no forwarding rules can query the
controller to install rules matching aspects of the packet’s header. The controller can also respond
to other events, such as a signal of switch failure, to proactively install forwarding rules. Afterward,
matching packets are forwarded according to the installed rule.
4.3 Architecture
In this section we describe the architecture design of the FORCE testbed. We discuss
the hardware, the off-the-shelf software, and custom software designed by the research team. We
introduce our virtual topology engine and our flow network evaluation system. A novel design
aspect of the FORCE is the use of single workstations to emulate entire datacenter racks full of
computing nodes. This emulation allows us to study the inter-rack networking traffic for distributed
applications and to understand how topologies impact performance.
4.3.1 Hardware
The hardware of the FORCE includes one primary server, twelve client workstations, and
two SDN-enabled switches. We note that the testbed is extensible and scalable to a very large
size. This set of computers used in the testbed is repurposed from upgraded student laboratories
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and completed research projects and is very low cost. The equipment is installed in a location
that allows students to have physical access to the equipment throughout the system building and
experimentation.
The primary server is a Dell Precision 330 workstation powered with an 2.40 GHz Intel
Core2 Quad processor with 4 GB of RAM. An additional dual-port gigabit Ethernet card was
added to the server to provide additional network connections. The twelve client workstations are
Sun Ultra20-M2 workstations, each with a dual-core AMD Opteron processor with 2 GB of RAM.
Two additional dual-port gigabit Ethernet cards were added to these workstations to provide four
additional network connections, bringing the total Ethernet ports to six each.
Figure 4.1: The ”Yoda” experimental SDN cluster, with separate control and data networks and
multiple connections to a OpenFlow-enabled switch.
The two network switches are Pica8 Pronto 3290 48-port gigabit Ethernet switches. Each
switch is OpenFlow enabled. Two VLANs are established on one SDN-enabled switch for the
control and access netwoparagraphrks. The server and the workstations each have one connec-
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tion to both of these VLANs. The remaining 48-port switch is connected to each of the additional
four gigabit Ethernet switches of the twelve workstations. This switch allows each workstation to
be connected to a maximum of four other workstations. This switch is the primary target of the
reprogrammability of the FORCE testbed.
4.3.2 Software
The FORCE package contains a number of important standard and custom software suites
and tools for managing the testbed and quantifying experimental results.
Open Source Software The FORCE utilizes several open source software packages with-
out modification, including Ubuntu Linux 12.04.2, Open vSwitch 1.11.0, Floodlight v0.90, and
Python 2.7. The server and workstations in the cluster all use Ubuntu Server 12.04.2 as the base
operating system. Since the release of Linux kernel version 3.3, Open vSwitch has been the default
bridge system. Open vSwitch is used to provide a virtual top-of-rack switch on each of the 12 work-
stations. This allows each workstation to emulate one datacenter rack with a configurable number
of computational nodes. There is a many-to-many communication network between these virtual
switches through the 48-port Pica8 physical switch as described above. The server node serves as
the central management node of the SDN-enabled testbed, using Floodlight v0.90 as the controller
software. The server is configured to control the two physical switches along with the 12 virtual
switches. When a new topology is deployed, this node issues the OpenFlow commands to install new
flows on the switches. Python 2.7 is core to the operation of the FORCE. Python scripts are used
to select topologies, issue OpenFlow commands, start experiments, collect data, and build graphs.
The specific software packages are discussed below.
Virtual Topology Engine The core of the virtual topology package is the force tool,
which implements a virtual network topology by installing forwarding rules on the SDN switches in
a cluster. The topology is described in a series of layers using the NetworkX Python package [5].
Each layer maintains a network graph, as well a method for finding a path between any two vertices.
The lowest layer describes the physical topology of hosts, switches, interfaces, and links, including
characteristics such as hardware addresses and link speeds. The tool then applies subsequent graph
layers that abstract each previous layer, building the virtual topology by translating edges into paths
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on the underlying graph. As a whole, this layered abstraction approach allows us to map desired
connectivity among vertices on the highest level graph to the lowest level flow rules to be installed
onto the SDN switches.
As an example, a virtual 2D-torus topology can be implemented in three layers, as shown
in Figure 4.2. In the first layer, the physical network is described. In the case of our experimental
cluster, we define a single 48-port switch, 12 virtual switches with 4 links each to the central switch,
and 12 hosts with links to the virtual switches. Then, we describe the desired topology, where
each virtual switch is connected to its neighbor in a 2D-torus. Each edge in the virtual topology
represents a path in the underlying topology, so the edge vs1, vs2 in Figure 4.2b translates to the
path (vs1, pronto, vs2) in Figure 4.2c. The topmost layer describes the hosts that are logically
connected, and each edge describes the full path between those hosts: the edge h1, h6 translates to
the path (h1, vs1, pronto, vs2, pronto, vs6, h6). Rules are then installed on the SDN switches: for
this path, rules are installed to forward traffic on pronto, vs1, vs2, and vs6.
Congestion Metric As our software was written to experimentally evaluate network
topologies, we wrote a tool to predict the congestion level of the network given a set of source/sink
pairs. This tool approximates the mean of all flows’ congested flow potentials divided by their
flow potentials when free of congestion, if all concurrent flows in the network were in a state of
equilibrium. We refer to this metric as the Link Sharing Score (LSS), where 0 < LSS ≤ 1. An
LSS of 1 means that there are no overutilized edges in the flow network, and a score of 0.5 would
describe a network where congestion cuts flow rates to 50%, on average.
In Algorithm 1, topo is an object containing a graph representation of the computer network
and a method that computes a static path between a pair of nodes. pairs is a set of source-sink
pairs, representing all concurrent flows on the network. In our experiments, this was a list of all
mapper-reducer relationships for a set of simulated Hadoop jobs.
The first loop of the algorithm assigns a usage amount to each edge in topo by summing
the potential rate of all flows through that edge. Line 3 finds the path from src to dst, which
could be the shortest path or any other walk that has been defined. Line 4 establishes the potential
uncongested rate of a flow by finding the lowest capacity edge in the path. In lines 5 and 6, this rate
is added to the usage of each edge in the path. This may or may not result in an overutilized edge.
The second loop finds the congested rate of each flow by finding the minimum capacity of
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(a) The topmost layer, defining all
possible source/destination pairs.
(b) Each abstraction layer defines the paths through the previous layer,
as well as a routing algorithm between nodes on this layer.
(c) The physical topology layer, consisting of hosts with virtual switches,
each connected through 4 interfaces to a central SDN-enabled switch.
Figure 4.2: A virtual topology is described as a sequence of abstraction layers, with each edge
representing a path on the layer below it. In this series of diagrams, h1, h6 in (a) translates to the
path (h1, vs1, vs2, vs6, h6) in (b), which then becomes h1, vs1, pronto, vs2, pronto, vs6, h6 in (c).
Paths on the lowest level become sets of rules to be installed on switches pronto, vs1, vs2, and vs6.
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(a) Source/sink pairs (a,f) and (b,g) with paths
(ac, cd, de, ef) and (bc, ce, eg).
(b) Source/sink pairs (a,f) and (b,g) with paths
(ac, ce, ef) and (bc, ce, eg).
Figure 4.3: In (a), the two paths do not share a link, and the LSS algorithm assigns a score of 1.
In (b), edge ce is shared, cutting both flows to half capacity and giving a mean congestion score of
0.5.
the congested edges in its path. Lines 10 and 11 again establish the path and uncongested rate along
that path. Lines 12-16 find the lowest shared capacity edge in the path, with Line 14 calculating the
shared capacity based on the fractional usage of the edge and Line 15 receiving the congested rate.
Lines 17 and 19 compute and return the mean quotient of the congested rates to the uncongested
rates.
4.4 Experiment
We select Hadoop MapReduce for the representative use case for demonstration of the
utility of the FORCE testbed. The literature [89] describes the potential speedup of MapReduce
shuffle traffic that is possible by positioning datacenter racks that contain the reduce tasks in close
network proximity to datacenter racks that contain the map task from the same MapReduce job.
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Algorithm 1 Link Sharing Score
1: procedure LSS(pairs, topo)
2: for all (src, dst) in pairs do
3: path← topo.path(src, dst)
4: path rate← min link(path)
5: for all edge in path do
6: edge.usage← edge.usage+ path rate
7: end for
8: end for
9: for all (src, dst) in pairs do
10: path← topo.path(src, dst)
11: path rate← min link(path)
12: rate← path rate
13: for all edge in path do
14: scaled rate← path rate×max(1, edge.capedge.usage )
15: rate← min(rate, scaled rate)
16: end for




This proposed enhancement requirs the dynamic reallocation of point-to-point connections between
top of rack switches in a two-dimensional torus topology. Our testbed is ideally suited for testing
this optimization. In this section we describe the use of the FORCE to experimentally test how
MapReduce performance is impacted by reallocation of point-to-point connections and to determine
if further research and investigation of the method is justified.
4.4.1 Hadoop Shuffle Simulator
The nodes comprising the testbed are not robust enough to run a real workload consisting
of multiple Hadoop jobs or multiple virtual Hadoop nodes. To solve this problem, and to ensure
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that the testbed supports a realistic shuffle traffic network load that corresponds to the traffic
between datacenter racks, we implemented a Hadoop shuffle traffic emulator within the FORCE.
We implemented a centrally controlled software suite that synchronizes bulk network data transfers
from map tasks to reduce tasks within the cluster. These data transfers are the same as the movement
of map tasks outputs to reducers across the cluster as seen in the shuffle phase of a real MapReduce
job.
The Hadoop shuffle emulator reads configurations from a set of files that describe the pseudo
Hadoop cluster within the FORCE. The cluster configuration file defines the number of emulated
nodes within in each virtual rack, the number of TaskTrackers within each emulated node, the
number of map and reduce slots present per TaskTracker, and the default HDFS block size. The
workload configuration file defines the number of jobs to be placed on the cluster during an experi-
ment, the input size of the data to be processed by the job, and the type of MapReduce job for each
job. With the configuration variables retrieved from these files, various workloads and workload
execution scenarios can be emulated within the FORCE without the need for robust servers running
multiple Hadoop virtual machines.
Given the set of configurations and experiments, the system is able to deploy the emulated
MapReduce jobs across the cluster that perform transfer of shuffle traffic. Based on the size of the
data to be processed and the HDFS block size, the system is able to determine the number of maps
task required for each job. The number of reduce tasks is determined by a default global parameter
or specific argument on a per job basis. The type of job to be run determines the ratio of map
task output relative to the block size. After the system is configured with the number of map and
reduce tasks per job and the size of the data transfer between all the map tasks and the set of reduce
tasks in each job, the transfer of data from map tasks to reduce tasks begins. Since we are only
interested in studying the inter-rack traffic, any map and reduce tasks that reside within the same
virtual datacenter rack do not transfer data.
In this section we describe the design of the experiments using the FORCE and our Hadoop
shuffle simulator that study the impact of placement of reduce and map racks within a datacenter.
We describe the cluster configuration, the workload placed on the environment, the data collected,
and the method of collection.
We initialized our cluster with the full set of 12 racks and 16 compute nodes per rack, with
8 map slots and 4 reduce slots per node. This configuration emulates a cluster with 1536 map
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slots and 768 reduce slots. Using the method of bin-packing placement [89], we ran three simulated
MapReduce jobs with reducers exclusively on three separate computing racks. Each reducer rack
had its own set of three feeding map racks. Thus we had three distinct sets of mapper and reducer
racks divided across our datacenter.
In our first experiment, each experimental run consisted of using the FORCE to build and
record a random 4x3 two dimensional torus topology, beginning continuous shuffle traffic from each
map rack to its destination reduce rack, and recording the total bytes transferred from each virtual
top-of-rack switch at each map rack. We ran 1000 experimental runs and recorded the amount
of data transferred at each map rack at equally spaced times. These measurements allowed us to
compute the average transfer rate at each map.
In our second experiment, each run consisted of again randomly placing the rack in different
positions in the 4x3 torus topology. We then began the flow of data between mappers and reducers
in deterministic sizes. We recorded the time required to complete each of these data flows. This
is different from the first experiment since less congested paths allow the transfer to finish sooner,
permitting straggler flows to continue on a network free of congestion.
In both experiments, we established a baseline for comparison with randomized topologies by
measuring the results with 500 runs using a fixed network topology with no particular distinguishing
characteristics.
4.4.2 Performance Evaluation
In this section we report evaluation results are on the network performance and for the
Hadoop MapReduce application.
4.5 Analysis
4.5.1 Network Performance Results
After sampling the mean transfer rate of 1000 random topologies, we found that the mean
and variance were significantly different than obtained with 500 runs using the baseline topology,
as shown in Table 4.1. We also found that the mean throughput for the baseline topology is
620.7Mb/s while the mean throughput for the randomly set of topologies is 563.6Mb/s. The variance
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Table 4.1: Mean Throughputs on Various Node Placements in a 2D-Torus
Node Placement Trials x¯ s
same 500 620.7 Mb/s 2.27 Mb/s
random 1000 563.6 Mb/s 79.78 Mb/s
of measured throughputs of the baseline is small, only 2.27Mb/s, whereas the variance of measured
throughputs of the set of 1000 randomly generated topologies is much larger, at 79.78Mb/s. This
indicates that there are topologies with better and/or worse congestion characteristics. We also
found that the baseline topology had a mean transfer rate that was higher than that of random
topologies. These results provide the motivation for future investigation into optimal topologies for
the MapReduce workloads.
Figure 4.4: The mean throughput of a set of 9 flows is shown, with each point representing a different
random placement of nodes within a 2D-torus. The congestion score, with 1.0 representing no shared
links, correlates well with the observed throughput.
Next, we used the described LSS congestion scoring algorithm to calculate the theoretical
mean congestion of each topology. These scores correlate reasonably well (r2 = 0.677) with the
mean throughput of each topology, as shown in Figure 4.4. This tendency can also be seen in
Figure 4.4, which supports our conjecture that certain topologies have less congestion than others,
given a certain set of flow patterns.
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Figure 4.5: Simulated Hadoop job completion time also correlates with network congestion. The
difference between optimal and suboptimal configurations can have significant effect on the overall
time taken.
4.5.2 Hadoop Performance Results
The results from the second experiment of simulated Hadoop jobs showed similar results. A
histogram of simulated job run times is shown in Figure 4.6. As shown in the chart, some run times
are over 2.5 times higher than base case times. These worst case configurations ideally would be
the topologies an intelligent system would strive to avoid. Additionally, Figure 4.5 shows that the
LSS congestion score correlates with the completion time of jobs, which is to be expected as the job
completion time affected by the time spent transferring intermediate data. This correlation shows
a congestion score is potentially an early indication of shuffle time performance and can be used to
intelligently select a topology given a specific network flow pattern.
4.5.3 Implementation Evaluation
The combination of the FORCE testbed along with the Hadoop shuffle traffic simulator has
allowed us to obtain encouraging experimental results to support the hypothesis about topologi-
cal impact on MapReduce shuffle traffic. Without the use of the testbed and traffic simulator, a
much more significant investment of research dollars and time would have been needed to obtain
experimental results to support our hypothesis.
The experimental results suggest that further investigation is warranted. We are encouraged
by the results and can now begin further study of flow optimization under different topologies. Our
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Figure 4.6: Histogram of simulated Hadoop shuffle times with random placement of racks in two-
dimensional torus topology.
hypothesis that topology can impact the completion time of MapReduce shuffle traffic is reinforced
through experimental results.
The use of the FORCE as an emulated testbed for studying the effect of network topology
on application performance in a datacenter has proven beneficial. Continued use of this research
methodology could prove financially advantageous to academic and research organizations.
4.5.4 Discussion
In our second research approach of investigating cyber maneuver for application optimiza-
tion, we have presented the Flow Optimized Route Configuration Engine. The FORCE is a data-
center testbed emulator with a programmable interconnection controlled by an SDN controller. The
FORCE allows researchers to get an early indication of the worthiness of data center topology hy-
pothesis. These experimental results come without the cost in time or funding of building production
level data centers. Additionally, the system features a Virtual Topology Engine, a Flow Network
Evaluation System, and a Hadoop shuffle traffic simulator. We have presented initial experimental
results to suggest that datacenter topology, specifically placement within a 4x3 2-D torus network,





Our third interest area for studying maneuver in cyberspace is improving cybersecurity. Our
work with the Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform [62,64] introduces a Stochastic Petri Net model
of improving the survivability of a distributed and parallel application with the additions of moving
target defense and deceptive defense, two of the tactics of defensive cyberspace maneuver [16].
Distributed and parallel systems have become essential operational and logistical tools used
in many of today’s applications. They are used across academia, military, government, financial,
medical, and transportation industries. These systems have garnered the unwanted attention of
malicious intruders seeking to disrupt their confidentiality, integrity and availability. Applying the
military tactic of cyber maneuver can increase their security and provide defensive mechanisms
to extend survivability and improve operational continuity. Understanding the tradeoffs between
information systems security and operational performance when applying maneuver principles is of
interest to administrators, users, and researchers. To this end, we apply Stochastic Petri Nets to
the modeling of security enhancements with the Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform. This model




Distributed and parallel systems have become essential tools for the computation of com-
plex problems for multiple sectors of today’s society. Government, industry, and academia have
made significant financial investments into these infrastructures causing them to become critical to
their operational and logistical data driven processes. Protecting these valuable assets while ensure
efficient operations is essential to the mission and purpose of the organization.
Malicious actors seeking financial or intelligence gains are targeting supercomputers and
distributed computing centers at an increasing rate [2,26,70]. Their methods and efforts to disrupt
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the systems require network security professionals
and researchers to invest remarkable amounts of time and money into protecting these assets. We
argue that one approach to improving system security is the application of military doctrine and
tactics to the defense of distributed and parallel applications. This chapter presents our mode and
analysis of of the Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform focusing on extending the military concept
of maneuver to the defense of cybersystems [62,64].
Security and usability have always been competing interests in information systems. Adding
maneuverable elements and features into distributed and parallel applications affects the performance
and operational output of the system. Our goal is to understand and characterize how these ad-
ditional features can improve security while limiting the impact on operations. Our approach is
to develop a model of these processes and systems and to use the model for understanding and
evaluating these trade-offs.
Our work with the modeling the Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform (DMCP) provides the
following contributions:
• A Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) model of a defensive maneuver cyber platform utilizing moving
target defense and deceptive defense tactics.
• An analysis of our SPN model to understand the trade-offs between security and operations
in defensive maneuver cyber platform.
• A stochastic model of an attacker for targeting and penetration of systems and how moving
target defense and deceptive defense can thwart the attackers success
• Recommendations to augment the SPN model to build prototype systems implementing mov-
51
ing target and deceptive defense in parallel and distributed applications.
5.2 Architecture
In an effort to provide improved cybersecurity to a distributed and parallel application, we
have designed a model of a Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform using Stochastic Petri Nets. In the
model, we represent individual nodes that can operate in specific modes, along with the collection of
nodes that constitute the parallel and distributed application. We specifically apply the concepts of
moving target defense and deceptive defense to provide increased security. Individual nodes transi-
tion between operational, idle, and deceptive modes. Additionally, overall controls of the application
seek to ensure that a minimum number of nodes remain operational and deceptive as dictated by
the current operational and threat environment. In the event of increased adversarial activity or
indications and warnings of threat activity, the system parameters can be adjusted to provide a
more secure environment at the cost of operational output. Likewise, in low threat environments,
system settings can allow improved productivity at the cost of security. It is understood that these
tradeoffs in a system of this type are both necessary and beneficial to system administrators and
executive leadership.
In our model, a distributed and parallel system is composed of multiple individual nodes
controlled by a separate central management system. We assume that individual nodes are worker
nodes of the overall system and can be in one of three states, operational, deceptive, or idle. We
further assume that a node does not move directly from an operational state to a deceptive state,
but goes to an idle state first, and vice versa. The individual nodes can join or leave the cluster
with minimal operational overhead, but otherwise ensure the survivability of the system. One such
example of a systems that survives in this manner is JUMMP [65].
Each individual node is comprised of three places (operational, idle, deceptive) and 4 tran-
sitions (operational-to-idle, idle-to-operational, deceptive-to-idle, and idle-to-deceptive). There are
two universal places (minimum computation, minimum deceptive). There are eight intranode arcs
between the places and transitions for each node and an additional six external arc from the control
places into the node for management. A single token exists within each node and the place in which
it is found determines the state of the node, as described below. The number of nodes is configurable
by the system depending on the needs of the application designers.
52
Formally, a node can be describe as a Stochastic Petri Net as shown in Table 5.1.
5.2.1 Assumptions
We have placed some assumptions on our system to aid in modeling. These assumptions
are based on realistic expectations of the system in the real world. We assume that the system has a
centralized controller that is not a target of an attacker in this system. The centralized controller is
responsible for directing the node transitions between states, monitoring the status of all nodes, and
ensuring the rules and parameters of the system are obeyed. We assume the system control is aware
of the threat conditions and can make intelligent decisions based on this knowledge. We also assume
the system management is willing to lessen the operational throughput when threat conditions exists
that increases the probability of adversary action exceeds a predetermined threshold.
Table 5.1: Description of single node SPN
P = {po, pi, pd}
T = {toi, tio, tdi, tid}
λ = {1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0}
I− =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1




0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

W = {1, 1, ..., 1, 1}
Mo = {(1, 0, 0)|(0, 1, 0)|(0, 0, 1)}
5.2.2 Individual Node States
When a node is in the operational mode, it is an active member of the parallel and distributed
application. In an operational state the node is storing data, processing data, or transferring data to
other operational nodes in the system. In the instance of the application Hadoop, these nodes would
be engaged datanodes and task trackers performing MapReduce calculations. Operational nodes
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are listening to known TCP or UDP ports, creating network connections to other nodes listening
to these same ports, or transferring data on previously connected flows. Operational nodes are
susceptible to attacks from malicious actors, but each is providing an operational contribution as
part of the purpose of the parallel and distributed application. Operational nodes, when directed
by the central management system, can transition to the idle state. When this transition occurs we
assume that the application can continue to operate as a whole working system but with a loss of
operational capability.
An idle node is one which is available to be promoted to becoming either an operational or
a deceptive mode. In some instances, this node could be part of a larger shared computing resource
cluster and available to other users or applications. We assume that idle nodes are non-utilized
resources that are available but not susceptible to targeting by an attacker. When directed by the
central manager, the node transitions to becoming either an operational node or a deceptive node.
The third mode in which an individual node can exist is the deceptive mode. In the deceptive
mode a node is indistinguishable from an operational node to an outside observer. An attacker that
scans the network or enumerates the environment will be just as likely to target a deceptive node as it
would an operational node. The deceptive nodes are listening to the same TCP / UDP ports, creating
connections with other deceptive nodes, and transferring data between each other. Additionally, we
assume that decoy nodes have honeypot programs [84] that alert the central management system to
the existence of intruders on the network. These triggers can be used to increase the maneuver rate
of the nodes or adjust the ratio of computational to deceptive nodes.
Figure 5.1: Petri Net of individual node which can transition between three modes of operation.
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In the Petri Net model, each mode (operational, idle, and deceptive) is represented by a
place (PO, PI , PD, respectively). There is a single token which, by its place location, represents
the mode of the node. Timed transitions allow the token to move from operational to idle, idle to
operational, deceptive to idle, and idle to deceptive. These transitions also are fed by arcs from
the centralized control places (PNo, PNd) to ensure the system maintains the minimum number of
operational and deceptive nodes. Figure 5.1 shows a single node system with the places labeled
with names. The modes for the node are represented on the far right side of the node. The current
marking has the token in the idle place, indicating its current state.
5.2.3 System Parameters
The DMCP is composed of one or more individual nodes. The model has a set of configurable
parameters that allow exploration of the trade-offs between different system designs. Parameters
include the total number of nodes in the system, the number of nodes that are operational, deceptive,
and idle in the initial system configuration, and the upper and lower bounds of the number of nodes
for each of these states. The parameters can be used to compare tradeoffs of different configurations.
The system has a total number of N nodes. Each node is a single whole node as described
above. The system has a minimum number of nodes that must remain in the operational and
deceptive states, these are described with the variables O and D. Since Petri Net transitions are
atomic and nodes can not transfer directly between operational and deceptive states but must move
to the idle state, then N > O +D must hold true for the system in all configurations.
In order to ensure the stability of the maneuver system, the minimum number of operation
and deceptive nodes is managed by the system controls with the two places PNo and PNd. These
places are initialized with O and D tokens, respectively. An input arc exists between each control
place and the transition to the idle state. This arc is weighted to O + 1 and D + 1 with an
output arc back to the control place with weight O and D, respectively. This ensures that a node
that transitions into the idle state leaves at least the minimum nodes in its former state, thus not
violating the minimal levels set by the system designers. Additional, any transition from idle to
operational or deceptive states will deposit a token in the control place. The control place acts as a
counter of nodes in its state.
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Figure 5.2: An eight node Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform with three operational nodes, two
deceptive nodes, and three idle nodes.
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5.2.4 Maneuver Platform Builder
The defensive cyber maneuver system is modeled as a Stochastic Petri Net. We use the
Platform Independent Petri Net Editor (PIPE2) [31] to view and evaluate the system. PIPE2
provides a graphical user interface for drawing and building Petri Nets. These nets can then be
saved in a Petri Net Markup Language compatible file for use in other PNML tools. PNML is an
extension of XML as defined by the standard ISO/IEC 15909 Part 2 [23].
In order to aid in the creation of Petri Nets of our maneuverable system, we designed
and developed a maneuver platform builder that automates the creation of the nets. The builder
extends the standard XML libraries that currently exist in Python. This custom software tool, called
buildDMCP takes command line parameters of (N,O,D). The output of the program is a PNML
file that can be opened in PIPE2 or any other PNML compatible tool.
The buildDMCP tool takes an object oriented approach by defining the building blocks for
Petri Nets in general. Functions to build places, transitions and arcs are developed with optional
parameters. Using these building blocks, the code builds a single node of our maneuverable system
with the respective places, transitions, and arcs. Additionally, the system control are created and
connected to the node at the specified locations. Finally, depending on the user provided parameters,
the total number of nodes and minimal levels for computational and deceptive nodes are built.
The resultant Petri Net has all the places, transitions, and initial markings specified by the user.
Additionally, these items are organized and placed on the canvas in a visually appealing manner.
Animations and analysis of the nets are done within the PIPE2 application. Figure 5 shows defensive
cyber model with N = 8, O = 3, and D = 2 created with buildDMCP and visualized in PIPE2.
P0 and P1 in this figure represent the centralized control mechanism of the system (PNo and PNd).
These places maintain a count of the current number of operational and deceptive nodes. When a
node transitions from idle to either operational or deceptive states, a token is deposited into these
places. In order for a node to transition from either operational or deceptive, there must exist O+ 1
or D+ 1 tokens in these places, respectively. In the SPN, this is modeled with output arcs of weight
O + 1 or D + 1 and input arcs of weight O or D.
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5.3 Operational Analysis
To understand the trade-offs between security and operations in our system, we provide
some analysis of the DMCP. Understanding the characteristics and behaviors of the system under
different configurations will allow system designers and administrators to choose implementations to
meet their operational needs. Additionally, this improved understanding of the system will improve
our future efforts to build prototype software packages base on this model. We focus our operational
analysis on enumerating the potential markings and edges in the reachability graph, studying the
different maneuverability states of the system, and analyzing the impact of the transition firing rates
on the state distribution probability.
5.3.1 Enumerating and Categorizing State Space
Initially, we want to study how the parameters of the configuration affect the reachability
graph of the system. The DMCP is specified with three global parameters, N , O, and D. The
current state of the system can be described as a vector C of length N where each element Cj
represents the state (So, Sd, Si) of node j
th in the system. The total number of nodes in each state
can be represented by the variables (o, d, i). For each state or marking with equal counts of nodes
in each mode can be in multiple combinations. It can be shown that the total number of states or








i = N − o− d
(5.1)
This equation is a summation over the range of two variables that describe the count of
computation and deceptive nodes. The equation is similar to the computation of multistate combi-
nations, since with have N nodes that can be either operational, deceptive or idle. The number of
operational nodes ranges from the system specified minimum to all remaining nodes after preserving
the minimal level of deceptive nodes. Likewise, the deceptive node count ranges from the defined
minimal level to all other nodes minus the minimal operational nodes.
The size of the state or marking space of the DMCP is affected by the three variables of the
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system. It can be shown the maximum state space for a given N is indirectly proportional to the
minimum levels of operation and deceptive nodes (O and D). This allows the summation to have
a larger range, thus resulting in the maximum state space. The minimal size of the state space is
calculated when you maximize O and minimize D or vice versa. This results in only one possible
value of o and d in the system.
Figure 5.3 plots the minimum and maximum values of the state space over the range 8 ≤
N ≤ 128. As the graph shows, the maximum is on the order of en where the minimum is on the
order of log n.
Figure 5.3: Scale of N
The number of edges in the reachability graph can be calculated when consider each marking
and how many possible next markings are available. Each idle node can transition to either an
operational or deceptive state since all minimums are preserved. If the current number of operational
nodes is greater than the minimum number of operational nodes required, each operational node
is available to maneuver towards the idle state. Likewise with the deceptive nodes, if the current
number exceeds the minimum, those nodes are eligible to maneuver to idle. Using Iverson brackets,
where the conditional between the square brackets equals one when the statement is true and zero
if false, the number of edges for a particular nodes can be expressed as shown in Equation 5.2.
Where o, d, i represent the current number of operational, deceptive, and idle nodes in the system
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respectively.
|Enode| = 2i+ o[o > O] + d[d > D] (5.2)
Calculating the total number of edges in reachability graph can be calculated by multiplying
the number of total nodes in the graph (Equation 5.1) by the number of edges per node (Equation 5.2)
and dividing by 2. Since reachability graphs are not directed graphs, a pair of markings connected











Each marking of the DMCP can be classified based on the maneuverability of the entire
cluster. The maneuverability of the cluster is a measure of the amount that nodes can change from
one mode to the next. An idle node is always eligible to change states, where operational and
deceptive nodes can only maneuver if the current count of nodes is greater than the minimum levels.
When the current state of the system has o = O and d = D the system is considered minimally
maneuverable because only the N − O −D idle nodes can maneuver. When the system has more
of both operational and deceptive node than the minimum configuration ((o > O) and (d > D))
then the system is considered fully maneuverable since all nodes can maneuver at the next moment.
Operationally maneuverable states are those where only the operational and idle nodes can be the
next to maneuver. Likewise, in deceptively maneuverable states only the deceptive and idle nodes
can maneuver.
The number of markings that fall into each maneuver state can also be calculated. Breaking
down the number of total markings shown in Equation 5.1, we can build the necessary equations
for each set. The minimally maneuverable states are those where the number of operational and
deceptive nodes is minimal and are shown in Equation 5.4. The deceptively maneuverable states
(Equation 5.5) are those where the number of operational nodes is at the minimum (o = O) and the
number of deceptive nodes ranges from one more than the minimum (D+1) to all but the minimum
number of operational nodes (N − O). Likewise, the operationally maneuverable states (Equation
5.6) are those where the deceptive nodes are minimized (d = D) and the operational nodes range
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from one more than the minimum (O + 1) to all but minimum deceptive nodes (N − D). Fully
maneuverable states (Equation 5.7) are when the operational nodes range from one more than the
minimum (O + 1) to all but one more than the minimum number of deceptive nodes (N −D − 1)
and all but the current number of operational node (N − o). These equations will be needed when
we study the probability of an attacker being able to compromise an operation or deceptive node.
Minimally =
N !

















o!d!(N − o− d)! (5.7)
5.3.3 Transition Firing Rate Impact
Stochastic Petri Nets have transitions that fire with an exponentially distributed random
variable firing delay. Each transition j has a rate λj used to calculate the delay. We have studied
the effect that the firing rate has on the probability distribution of the steady state of the system.
Since an SPN is isomorphic to a continuous time Markov chain, the steady state distribution
pi of an SPN can be solved by using the transition rate matrix Q, where Q is the rate between states of
the reachability graph and diagonals are the negative sum. Q, also called the infinitesimal generator,
has square dimensions equal to the number of markings in the reachability graphs (Equation ??)
and sparsely populated with twice the number of edges in the graph (Equation 5.2). As you can see,
as N , O, and D grow the size of Q and complexity to solve for pi increases.
PIPE2 provides a module for determining the reachability graph and conducting the steady
state analysis. We use this tool to study the probability distribution for our system and the firing
rate impact on the distribution. It can be shown with all transition firing rates equal, the DMCP
markings are equally likely.
We began by grouping the transitions in each node into pairs. One group (Tio, Tdi) ma-
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neuvers the individual towards operational while the second group (Toi, Tid) maneuvers towards
deceptive. Varying the rate of the firing rates of the two groups changes the state space probabil-
ity distribution of the entire cluster. We grouped each possible state by the number of operational
nodes (the marking of PNo) and calculated their combined probabilities. This way we are able to see
how the transition firing rates impact the probability the system has various levels of computational
state.
Study the reachability graphs of four separate configurations. In these four configurations,
we only varied the total number of nodes (6,7,8,9) while keeping the minimum levels of operational
and deceptive nodes consistent (O = 3, D = 2). As shown in Figure 5.4 when decreases the opera-
tional maneuver rate with respect to the deceptive maneuver rate increase the likelihood our system
will hover around the minimal level of operational nodes. While increasing the operational rate will
cause our system to trend towards overly operational. Though as we increase the size of N with
each graph we change the highest level of operational nodes, our system still trends towards this
highest level.
(a) 6-3-2 (b) 7-3-2
(c) 8-3-2 (d) 9-3-2
Figure 5.4: Maneuver rate effect on probability of computational composition
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5.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we study the security improvements gained from the addition of moving
target and deceptive defense mechanisms of the DMCP. The overall security posture of a distributed
and parallel system along with operational considerations allows system designers to make decisions
on the number of nodes necessary for deploying the system to meet the operational and security
goals of the organization. We will discuss the model of an adversary that we will consider for this
analysis along with how each parameter affects the probability of withstanding the attempts of the
attacker.
5.4.1 Attacker Model
The model of an attacker that we use to evaluate the DMCP is a single adversary who
will target only operational or deceptive nodes. The attacker is unable to distinguish between
operational and deceptive nodes and selects with equal probability a random active node to target.
Once selected, the attacker targets and attempts to gain user or elevated access to the node using
its various on-hand exploitation tools. After a random amount of time being targeted, the node is
compromised. We refer to this time as compromise time (tc) and model it as an exponential random




The deceptive defense mechanisms of the system protect against this attacker with the
introduction of deceptive nodes in two manners. First, the current composition of the cluster with a
number of operational and deceptive nodes impacts the probability that a randomly selected active
node is an operational node. Secondly, once a targeted node is penetrated, if the node was an
operational node, the node is compromised and provides no operational use to the computational
purpose of the distributed system. When a deceptive node is penetrated, the embedded honeypot
software alerts the system administrators of the presence of an intruder. This notification allows the
system administrators and network security personnel to continue to observe the attacker’s behaviors
or adjust the defensive posture of the system as a whole. The compromise of a deceptive node does
not impact the operational state of the distributed system since the node was already in deceptive
mode, providing only security enhancement.
Additional protection is provided by the moving-target defense mechanism of the system.
As determined by the firing of the transitions to maneuver individual nodes between modes, targeted
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nodes can maneuver to an idle state before the attacker is able to gain access to the system. An
operational node targeted by an attacker can maneuver to idle and evict the adversary from that
node, thus interrupting its opportunity to compromise the node. This moving-target defense can also
weaken the strengths of the deceptive defense when a targeted deceptive node maneuvers towards idle
because it prevents the system administrators from discovering the presence of the intruder. Once
ejected from a targeted node, the attacker begins to conduct information gathering and enumeration
of the system to select the next node to target.
A summary of the system and attacker parameters is provided in Table 5.2





N Number of nodes
O, D Minimal level of operational and de-
ceptive Nodes
o, d Current number of operational and
deceptive nodes





λac Attacker compromise rate
tc time to compromise currently tar-
geted node
5.4.2 Attack Survival
We evaluate how the DMCP improves the security of a distributed and parallel system. We
will study an overall probability of survival (Psurvival) which we define as the probability that the
actions of an attacker targeting a randomly selected active node will not result in the compromise
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of an operational node. For a baseline comparison, we will assume that a standard distributed and
parallel system will have a probability of survival equal to zero. Though this is not quite accurate,
any external defenses and security measures employed in support of a standard system could be
deployed to our system, so we evaluate how our system increases this probability. Our goal is to
attempt to maximize the probability of survival.
Equation 5.8 breaks down the probability of survival into three other probabilities. We
discuss the overall equation and then study each individual probability with the goal of reaching a
maximum overall probability. The first probability to consider is the probability that a deceptive
node is targeted. If the deceptive node is targeted, it cannot result in the compromise of an op-
erational node. This is reflected in (5.8) as Pdt. An operational node is targeted with probability
(1 − Pdt). This could result in compromise if the node does not maneuver into the idle state be-
fore the node is defeated. The probability of the node maneuvering is a product of the probability
that it can maneuver (Pm) and the probability that the maneuver time is less than the defeat time
(P (tm < tc)).
To maximize the overall probability of survival, we want to maximize each individual prob-
ability. In the following sections, we discuss the control and configuration parameters of the system
and their impact to each of these individual properties.
Psurvive = Pdt + (1− Pdt) ∗ Pm ∗ P (tm < tc) (5.8)
5.4.3 Targeting Deceptive Nodes
The deceptive defense mechanism of the DMCP creates false targets on which we want the
adversary to waste valuable time and effort. We desire to maximize the probability that a randomly
selected active node will be deceptive instead of operational, while maintaining the required level of
operational capability to meet overall system productivity goals. At any given time, this probability,
assuming uniform probability of node selection, is number of deceptive nodes divided by the number
of active nodes (operational and deceptive nodes). When the number of nodes are equal, this
probability is 0.50. We have shown in Section 5.3.3 how adjusting the operational and deceptive
maneuver rates relative to each other can impact the operational composition of the DMCP. Using
this same analytic approach, we can show how varying the maneuver rate ratios can impact the
probability that a randomly selected node is deceptive. Shown in Figure 5.5 is plot from the same
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steady state analysis of four different DMCP configurations with varying numbers of total nodes
(6,7,8,9) but same level for the minimum operational and deceptive nodes (O = 3, D = 2). As
the Figure 5.5 shows, when the operational maneuver rate is smaller than the deceptive maneuver
rate, the size of the cluster and the deceptive node selection probability are positively correlated.
When the operational rate is larger than the deceptive rate, the cluster size and probability are
negatively correlated. Generally speaking, decreasing the ratio of the operational maneuver rate
and the deceptive maneuver rate increases to probability of an advisory targeting a deceptive node
rather than an operational node. As discussed earlier improves the probability of survival.
Figure 5.5: Probability of randomly targeting deceptive node as function of maneuver rate ratios
5.4.4 Probability of Maneuverability
Understanding the probability that an operational node can maneuver is related to the
maneuverability state. For an operational node to be enabled for maneuver to the idle state, the
system must be currently in either the operationally maneuverable or the fully maneuverable state.
It can be shown using the steady state analysis, that when the operational and deceptive maneuver
rates are equal that the probability of being in any of the possible markings is equal. Equation 5.9
shows the calculation for the probability that operational nodes are enabled to maneuver to the idle
state when maneuver rates are equal. This is solved by dividing the sum of the number of fully
operational markings (5.7) and the number of operationally maneuverable markings (5.5) by the
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To determine how N , O, and D affect this probability, we calculate the impact on the
probability as we increase the size of the cluster and the scale of the minimum numbers for operational
and deceptive nodes as percentages of the overall size of the cluster. Figure 5.6 shows this analysis.
In Figure 5.6 we vary the size of the cluster from 16 to 256 nodes while testing different percentages
for the minimums. In all calculations the minimums for the operational and deceptive nodes are
equal. In the Figure 5.6, the orange line marked with dots shows the result when O and D are equal
to 25% of the total number of nodes.
As shown in Figure 5.6, a network where O and D are equal to 37% of N , the probability of
an operational node being able to maneuver approaches approximately 60% as N grow very large.
A network with minimum levels equal to 43% of N , we will not ever exceed approximately 25%
operational node maneuverability. These configurations for DMCP systems would not be optimal
when a high level of maneuverability is desired.
Figure 5.6: Probability of operational node maneuver as function of cluster size and minimum levels
This chart provides rules of thumb that can be used by a system administrator for designing
a DMCP given the operational and security goals of the system . For example, the arrow in Figure
5.6 points to the datapoint where N = 48 and O = 12 and D = 12. At this configuration, the
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probability is greater than 90% that a targeted operational node will be enabled to maneuver. For a
goal of 90% maneuverability and 48 nodes are available, this is one possible configuration. Increasing
the number of minimal nodes required decreases the probability of an operational node being able
to maneuver.
Further analysis of the configuration where N = 48 is presented in Figure 5.7. In this chart,
we plot the operational node maneuver probability as a function of the number of deceptive nodes
with the total number of nodes fixed at 48. The labels on the curve mark are referred to as the
knee in the curve. This is the point where the probability of the an operational node being able to
maneuver begins rapidly decreasing as you increase the minimal number of deceptive nodes. This
is calculated by find the point in which the slope is smaller than -1. We annotate this point as the
highest value for the deceptive nodes minimum where the probability remain approximately at its
max value. For example, for the plot where the minimum operational nodes is 16, the knee is the
curve is where the minimum number of deceptive nodes is equal to 12. A system designer can choose
any value for D less than this point and maintain essentially the same probability that operational
nodes are able to maneuver when targeted by the attacker.
Figure 5.7: Probability of operational node maneuver enablement as function of number of deceptive
nodes minimums (48 total nodes)
5.4.5 Maneuvering before Node Compromise
Finally, we strive to maximize the probability that our targeted operational node maneuver
before the attacker can successfully gain access to the node, while maintaining the required level of
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operational capability to meet overall system productivity goals. This is calculated as a probability
of the next maneuver time is smaller than the time to defeat the node. Both of these times are
modeled as exponential random variables. The probability that of one exponential random variable
is less than another random variable is well studied [79] and is equal to the ratio of the first rate to
the sum of two rates. For our system, the two rates are the deceptive maneuver rate (λdm) and the
attacker compromise rate (λac). Equation 5.10 shows this calculation.




When the rate of deceptive maneuver and the rate of attacker compromise are equal, the
probability of the maneuver occurring before the compromise is 50%. Figure 5.8 shows how varying
the two rates over the range of (0,16) impacts the probability of maneuver before compromise. As
the ratio of deceptive maneuver to the attacker comprise rate increases, the likelihood of survivability
increases as shown in Figure 5.10. Maximizing this probability increases the overall probability of
survival of the system.
Figure 5.8: Probability of operational node maneuvering before attacker can penetrate
5.5 Discussion
In this section we provide a summary of the impact of the operational and security pa-
rameters on the system. By providing a list of rules of thumb for potential implementation of the
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DMCP, we give system administrators an initial starting point for designing implementations of our
model in prototype deployments. We also address other potential security benefits that have not
been addressed in this work.
Maximizing operational capability is essential to an organization that utilizes distributed
and parallel computing for computational analysis. System designers and engineers want to ensure
they set their minimum operational node count (O) to meet the lowest acceptable output from the
system. This value also needs to ensure the cluster remains stable and uncorrupted at this minimal
level. As shown in Figure 5.4, it is very possible for your system to spend a significant amount of
time at the minimum operational level depending on the values of your maneuver rates. As shown
in Figures 5.6 and 5.7, the lower the minimum value for the operational nodes, the higher your
probability of your operational nodes being able to maneuver. This brings us to our first rule of
thumb:
Rule of Thumb #1: Set the minimal operational node parameter just above the
operational breaking point of your system
Deceptive nodes allow attackers to waste time and effort on penetrating decoy nodes allowing
operational nodes to be left uncontested and increasing the time to compromise of operational nodes.
Additionally deceptive nodes when running honeypot software exposes the presence, interest, and
tools of an attacker. We also have shown that the higher the minimum level of deceptive nodes in a
system decreases the available nodes that can maneuver between states creating static environments.
Static environments defeat our moving target defense advantages and lowers the probability that
operational nodes are enabled to maneuver when targeted by an adversary. Figure 5.7 highlights
that at some point increasing the minimum level of deceptive nodes causes a significant drop in the
probability of maneuverability enablement of operational nodes. In light of these observations, we
present our second rule of thumb:
Rule of Thumb #2: Set the minimal deceptive node parameter as equal to or
just less than the minimum number of operational nodes
The ratio of the operational and deceptive maneuver rates greatly impacts the composition
of your cluster. As shown in Figure 5.6, increasing the operational maneuver rate as compared to
the maneuver rate makes the system more likely to maintain a high count of operational nodes.
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Conversely, by lowering the operational maneuver rate with regards to the deceptive maneuver
rate, the system takes on a higher level of deceptive nodes. Adjusting the ratio of the operational to
deceptive maneuver rate is much more preferred method of controlling the composition of the DMCP
than adjusting the minimal levels of operational and deceptive nodes. This ratio can be visualized as
control knob to be adjusted based on the current threat condition of the system. Under low threat,
increase the operational maneuver rate and under high threat conditions, decrease the rate. This is
summarized in our next rule:
Rule of Thumb #3: Increase the availability of operation nodes in the DMCP by
increasing the operational maneuver rate. Maneuver the DMCP to a more deceptive
and defendable state by decreasing the operational maneuver rate.
Maneuvering nodes between the operational and idle modes imposes overhead associated
with replicating data blocks, starting and stopping any worker threads, and joining and exiting the
cluster membership. The time to complete the overhead tasks delays the beginning of the operational
use of the node. Frequent maneuvers into and out of operational mode could cause the system to
become unstable or ultimately unavailable. System administrators must understand the threshold
frequency where the system becomes invalid and attempt to maintain operational maneuver rates
lower than this value. This is captured below:
Rule of Thumb #4: Ensure the operational and deceptive maneuver rates are
limited to ensure the underlying distributed and parallel system does not break from
having nodes maneuver too frequently
In the event that an attacker targets an operational node and attempts to gain access, the
moving target defense mechanisms protect the system by maneuvering to the idle state before the
compromise is complete. The probability of the maneuver is a function of the deceptive maneuver
rate and the attackers compromise rate. Security professionals should seek to gain intelligence
about potential adversaries and understand their capabilities to estimate their rate of compromise.
Maintaining a deceptive maneuver rate above the estimated attackers rate will create a better than
50% probability that the node would maneuver before the attack is successful. The last rule of
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thumb presents this observation:
Rule of Thumb #5: Set the deceptive maneuver rate higher than the estimated
attacker compromise rate
There are additional security facets that can be considered for an even further analysis of
the DMCP. Currently our analysis is limited to a single attacker. Multiple attackers or multiple
simultaneous attacks could be modeled in a similar manner as we have shown here. There would
need to be an additional statistical distribution for the number of ongoing attacks factoring into the
calculation of the probability of an operational node being compromised. Additionally, a different
or more complex attacker model could be used to study how these security enhancements would
improve the defensible of a distributed and parallel system. Lastly, we don’t consider the residual
effects of the presence of an attacker after a node maneuvers to another state. These effects will
increase the success rate of future attacks by leaving backdoors or known exploits. Our model also
has no mechanism to deal with the increasing dangers of insider threats.
When we consider the targeting of a node running in the deceptive mode, we can use the
same analysis from studying the probability of an operation node maneuvering to the idle state before
an attacker can successfully penetrate the node. It is advantageous to the system administrator and
network security professional to have an intruder successfully gain access to a deceptive node. This
provides an indication of an adversary interest in your network and systems, allowing proactive
defensive measures to be taken. The probability of success against a targeted deceptive node is
similar to (5.10) but replacing the deceptive maneuver rate with the operational maneuver rate
(λom). As such, having an operational maneuver rate lower than the compromise rate would increase
the likelihood of the honeypot software detecting the presence of the attacker.
Lastly, the security enhancements from moving target defense in the DMCP only consider
when nodes are being targeted. Our model of an attacker also must implement a reconnaissance or
enumeration stage to collect data on our system before targeting. Additional security enhancements
are provided by the moving target defense mechanism during this enumeration stage. The informa-
tion gathered is only valuable until the next node maneuvers. Evaluating the enhancement of the
MTD mechanisms during this stage is another area that can be expanded upon to have a better
understanding of the value of our model on distributed and parallel system security.
In this chapter, we present research into using cyber maneuver for security improvement
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with the introduction of our model of the Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform utilizing Stochastic
Petri Nets. By utilizing moving target defense and deceptive defense tactics, we have shown that we
can increase the complexity and composition of a parallel and distributed application by increasing
the ratio of deceptive to operational nodes and increasing the rate in which nodes transition between
states. We have theorized these characteristics can present a more defendable platform due to the
changing attack surface. We have introduced a stochastic process for an attacker attempting to
target and penetrate our system and how the additional security concepts improve survivability and
impede the attacker’s success. We have presented an analysis of the probability of surviving the
actions of the attacker based on the ratio of the maneuver rates and the attackers compromise rate.
Lastly, we present rules of thumb to be used by system designers whom wish to implement this





The final area of our research focuses on combining many pieces from our preceding chap-
ters to build a Prototype Resource Maneuver Manager. This software implementation combines the
resource provisioning aspects discussed in Chapter 3 along the security enhancements of Chapter 5.
Fortified, the Prototype Resource Maneuver Manager, shows how various aspect of military maneu-
ver combined together can be used to build real maneuverable applications to provide enhancements
to distributed computing. Additionally, Fortified verifies the Petri-Net model for a moving-target
and deceptive defense system as discussed in Chapter 5.
6.1 Introduction
Modeling of systems provides a mathematical understanding of the behaviors and charac-
teristics expected of implementations. The model allows a designer to verify that the behavior is
consistent with the goals and objectives of the system. Modeling is useful when the complexity of
the system is such that full mathematical evaluation is unfeasible. Distributed and parallel systems
with large amounts of asynchronicities and concurrency are examples of complex system. When
building a system based on a model, studying the implementation of the system can be compared
to anticipated results based on the model for further understanding and validation.
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Our works in designing, building, and modeling maneuverable applications are combined
in this chapter to build the Prototype Resource Maneuver Manager. The system, Fortified, is a
prototype implementation of the system described with the Petri Net model introduced in Chapter
5. Additionally, we repurpose parts of the underlining code and functionality from JUMMP as
discussed in Chapter 3 to deploy this system into the Palmetto Cluster at Clemson University. The
prototype system is studied and used to validate the modeling results of moving-target and deceptive
defenses as introduced in the Defensive Cyber Maneuver Platform.
This work with the Prototype Resource Maneuver Manager, Fortified, provides the following
contributions:
• A fully functional prototype software suite to deploy maneuverable Hadoop clusters into dis-
tributed environments with individual nodes that maneuver between operational, idle, and
deceptive modes of operation,
• A discrete event simulator version of the Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform that allows long
running simulations to provide statistical analysis of the behaviors of the modeled system, and
• A validation of the mathematical probabilities of survival when targeted by a modeled attacker
and a verification of the security enhancements provided by moving-target and deceptive de-
fense mechanisms.
6.2 Architecture
The Prototype Resource Maneuver Manager, Fortified, is a software package built in Python
that deploys a working system implementing the resource provisioning aspects of JUMMP along with
the moving-target and deceptive defense security enhancements of DMCP. We use Hadoop as the
underlying distributed system for both the operational and deceptive nodes. Fortified includes a
robust controller that deploys a maneuverable application where client nodes maneuver between the
states of operational and deceptive Hadoop client nodes and an idle available state.
6.2.1 Fortified Controller
The main component of Fortified is a multithreaded resource scheduler which establishes
the distributed application and maneuvers nodes between states based on the Petri-Net model of
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the DMCP. Fortified maintains complete knowledge of the state of the each individual nodes and
triggers the signals for each node to perform the next maneuver.
Fortified runs in two overall modes of execution: prototype and simulation. In prototype
mode, Fortified connects to real distributed nodes in a cluster and starts and stops actual distributed
computing system processes and honeypot software suites. Maneuvers occur in real time and allow
systems to run for days or weeks while performing real operational jobs. In simulation mode,
Fortified acts as a discrete event simulator useful for studying the behaviors of the system to ensure
correctness of configurations. Simulation mode also provides verification of the Petri Net model of
the Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform.
Using an object-oriented programming approach with a Model-View-Controller design, For-
tified has a list of objects representing each individual node that can maneuver between operational,
idle and deceptive states. Each node object has a field for the current mode, the operational ma-
neuver timer, and the deceptive maneuver timer. The operational maneuver timer expires when a
node maneuvers towards the operational mode (deceptive to idle or idle to operational). Likewise,
the deceptive maneuver timer is for maneuvers towards the deceptive mode (operational to idle or
idle to deceptive). Operational and deceptive maneuver timers are set to infinity when the node is
already in the operational or deceptive states, respectively. Each maneuver timer is based on the
system-wide operational and deceptive maneuver rates as described by the DMCP system. Addi-
tionally, the node object possesses the needed functionality to conduct all maneuvers and interact
with the controller object. This includes responding to queries from the manager object on current
status and timers, updating the current mode, and resetting maneuver timers. The node object
also maintains a path to current programs to execute by the actual node to conduct each type of
maneuver, such as starting and stopping disturbed system daemons or honeypot software.
Fortified maintains current global settings for the system. These settings include the oper-
ational and deceptive maneuver rates, the minimum number required of operational and deceptive
nodes, the overall mode of execution (prototype or simulation) in which Fortified operates, and a
detailed event history of all maneuvers. Fortified contains internal functionality to provide an up-
to-date view of all nodes and their current mode of operation, either operational, deceptive, or idle.
The system is also able to signal individual nodes to maneuver when the timers expire or to reset
their timers in the event of change of overall maneuverability status. The system is able to transition
between modes of execution or to change the maneuver rates during run time.
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The system queries each node to discovery its next maneuver. Based on the earliest ma-
neuver possible between all nodes and the current count of nodes in each state, the system is able
to decide if any other timers must be maximized to preserved the system required minimum levels.
When the system transitions from fully maneuverable to operationally maneuverable, the deceptive
timer for all operational nodes is maximized. This is to ensure no operational node becomes idle
which would result in having less than the minimum amount of operational nodes. Likewise, for
transitions between fully maneuverable and deceptively maneuverable states, the operational timer
for the deceptive nodes is maximized. This is equivalent to the Toi and Tdi transitions being disabled
when P0 and P1 reach the minimum level of tokens as shown in Figure 5.1. The reverse transitions
(operationally to fully and deceptively to fully) will cause these previously maximized timers to be
reset in accordance with the current maneuver rates.
6.2.2 Web-based Interface
A web-based system interface is provided in the Fortified system in addition to the command-
line interface. The system interface allows an administrator to see a snapshot of the system, including
each node and its mode of operation, current timers, and the next node to maneuver. The interface
also provides the ability to start or stop the maneuvering, adjust the operational and deceptive
maneuver rates, and change the mode of execution between prototype and simulation. Additionally,
the interface provides historical plots of the cluster that can be dynamically built which display
maneuvers of each node and the overall trends of the system. A sample snapshot of a 16-3-2 system
is shown in Figure 6.1
The plots provided by the controller can also be built with a command line interaction with
the system. The first plot is an individual Gantt chart for each node indicating when it was in each
mode of operation during the lifetime of the system. The second chart is a stacked area chart plotting
the same information but the Y-axis is sorted by node types so total quantity of nodes in each mode
can be easily observed. A sample set of charts for the same run of a 16 node system is shown in
Figure 6.2 with dashed vertical lines indicating when the operational maneuver rate was changed,
which shows the impact on the composition of the cluster. In Figure 6.2, a total of 100 maneuvers
are made between each rate change to allow the system to stabilize at the current rates. The system
starts out with equal operational and deceptive maneuver rates (1.0). The first dashed vertical line
indicates a transition of the deceptive maneuver rate up to 4.0 with the operational maneuver rate
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Figure 6.1: Example web-based interface controller to Fortified with 16 nodes
remaining fixed at 1.0. The second transition returns the deceptive rate back to 1.0, and the third
transition increases the operational rate to 4.0 while the deceptive rate remains at 1.0. The first and
third window of time show equally balanced numbers of operational and deceptive nodes since the
maneuver rates are equal. During the second window, we see many more deceptive nodes due to the
increased tendency for nodes to maneuver towards the deceptive state versus the operational state.
The opposite is true in the fourth window where we see a predominance of operational nodes.
6.2.3 Attacker Modeling
Another optional feature of the Fortified system is the addition of a simulated attacker
as described in Chapter 5. The attacker module provides the ability to estimate gains from the
moving-target and deceptive defense features of the system. The single attacker is available in both
the prototype and simulation modes of execution.
In the discrete event simulation mode of the system, the attacker queries the main controller
for a list of the active and deceptive nodes. This retrieval of this list is comparable to the recon-
naissance phase that an attacker would undergo to enumerate possible targets and detect potential
vulnerabilities in which to exploit. Though our moving-target defenses would have an impact on
this phase of an attack, we choose not simulate or study it and reserve it for an area of future study.
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(a) Gantt like chart of node maneuvers (b) Stacked area plot of nodes grouped by nodes
Figure 6.2: Visuals produced by the web-based controller for a 16 node prototype resource maneuver
manager
After receiving a list of active nodes, the attacker randomly selects, with uniform probability,
a node from the active list. This node is now targeted by the attacker and will remain so until the
attacker’s compromise timer expires or the node maneuvers. This timer is a random variable drawn
from an exponential distribution with rate equal to the attacker compromise rate (λac). This rate is
configurable within the system and allows comparisons with the operational and deceptive maneuver
rates to study the improved security of the system.
The attacker’s attempt to compromise the system can have three different outcomes. The
first outcome is when the compromise timer expires and the targeted node is an operational node.
This is a successful compromise and is advantageous of the attacker but to the disadvantage of
the system owner. The second outcome is the compromise timer expires when the targeted node
was deceptive. This results in the internal honeypot software of the deceptive node alerting the
system owners of the presence of an attacker. This result is to the network security professional
advantage because it provides valuable monitoring and intelligence collection opportunities. It is
also a disadvantage to the attacker because any continued efforts to exploit the system are under
surveillance by the defenders and wasted since no operational capabilities are degraded in the system.
The final result is that either of the maneuver timers expires and the attacker is removed from the
system. The attacker has wasted time and effort and increases its probability of detection and
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exposure of exploitation tools. This result has mixed benefits to the system administrator and
network defender. When a deceptive node maneuvers to idle and removes the attacker, this is a
missed opportunity for the defender to gather information on the attacker.
When using an attacker, the Fortified system running in discrete event simulation mode
records a detailed event log of all targeting attempts and result. At the conclusion of the targeting
of a node, when maneuver or compromise timer expire, the attacker restarts the targeting process.
This action allows us to record various targeting and compromise statistics for analysis of different
configurations of the Fortified system.
In the prototype mode of execution the attacker module performs in a similar manner to
the simulation mode. However, there are a few exceptions in the behavior. When a node becomes
targeted, the attacker launches a process on the remote node. This process sets the compromise
timer and waits for it to expire. At expiration, it searches for the operational Hadoop daemons
and kills them. It logs this successful defeat and the targeting process restarts. In the event that
operational daemons are not detected, it is an indication the targeted node is deceptive. This
result is also logged and the targeting process restarts. In the event of a node maneuvering before
the compromise timer expires, the maneuvering node searches for and kills the attacker processes.
Additional system checks are deployed to insure no previously compromised operational nodes ever
rejoin the operational or deceptive clusters. This feature allows us to study the operational capability
of a cluster under attack and measure various statistics of a prototype system. This evaluation is a
future area of study and is not covered in this chapter.
6.3 Model Verification
Another feature of the Fortified system is the ability to verify the Defense Maneuverable
Cyber Platform as described in Chapter 5. Combined with the discrete event simulator and the
attacker mode, we add a model verification module to take measurements for the simulation and
compare them to our modeled or calculated results. Showing that our discrete event simulation of
the system performs as described by the model and various analysis equations in Chapter 5 validates
our model.
We evaluate our overall equation (5.8) for calculating the probability of a randomly selected
active node not resulting in compromise of an operational node. We refer to this as the probability of
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surviving an attack. We analyze each component for validation. We strive to maximize each of the
components, keeping in mind that the goal is to maximize the overall probability of survival. Once
all three individual probabilities are verified, we study the overall probability of survival behavior
in simulation and compare it our modeled calculations.
6.3.1 Probability of Defensive Targeting
The probability of defensive targeting is analyzed first. When the attacker chooses a random
active node to target, the node can be either deceptive or operational. In the event that a deceptive
node is selected, the system survives this attack since it cannot result in an operational node being
compromised. In the event that an operational node is selected, other defense features must be
utilized to survive this attack. As such, we strive to maximize the probability that a defensive node
is targeted.
The calculation of this probability is based on the ratio of operational to deceptive nodes
at any given time of the system. By using the steady state probability of the Petri Net model along
with the number of operational and deceptive nodes in each marking of the reachability graph,
we can compute a weighted average of this ratio of nodes. Recall from previous calculations and
observations that solving the steady steady probabilities involves a infinitesimal generator of the size
of M2 where M is the number of markings in the Petri Net. M grows on the order of eN where N is
the number of nodes in the system. Due to the complexity of solving such a large matrix, we use the
constrained calculations for smaller networks as shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. These calculations
are based on networks of size 6, 7, 8 and 9 nodes where the minimum number of operational and
deceptive nodes is 3 and 2, respectively.
We run Fortified in discrete event simulation mode for 100 randomize simulations where each
simulation consists of 1,000 node maneuvers. We vary the ratio of the operational to the deceptive
maneuver rates from (0.25, 1.0, 4.0) and test all four configurations discussed above (6-3-2, 7-3-2, 8-
3-2, and 9-3-2). For each simulation, the total number of node-seconds for operational and deceptive
nodes is calculated. The probability of a randomly targeted node being deceptive is calculated as
the deceptive node-seconds divided by the sum of the operational and deceptive node-seconds. The
mean and standard deviation of these percentages is shown in Figure 6.3 along with the calculated
probabilities from the Petri-Net solver of PIPE2.
In Figure 6.3, each group of bars represents the same node count configuration and minimum
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Figure 6.3: Measured vs Calculated Probability of a Random Targeted Node being Deceptive
levels of operational and deceptive nodes. Each individual bar height represents the mean of the
probability of a defensive node being targeted. The error bar is one standard deviation from the
mean while the horizontal bar represents the calculated probability. Each measured mean is within
one standard deviation of the calculated probability of a randomly selected node from all active
nodes being deceptive. Figure 6.3 shows that the calculated probabilities the measure are very close
for all values tested. These results provide strong support of validation to our model for deceptive
node targeting.
6.3.2 Probability of Maneuver Ability
In this section, we study the probability of an operational node being enabled to maneuver
to the idle state. Minimum levels of operational nodes are required for some distributed systems to
remain operational without loss of data or required operational output. Based on these minimum
levels, in some cases operational nodes may be unable to maneuver into the idle state until another
node becomes operational. In the minimum and deceptively maneuverable states, operational nodes
are static targets and our moving-target defense mechanism provides no additional security. We
strive to increase the probability of operational nodes having the ability to maneuver.
When operational and deceptive maneuver rates are equal, we previously have shown this
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probability is a ratio of the number of fully maneuverable and operationally maneuverable states
divided by the total number of markings. When the maneuver rates are not equal, this is calculated
as a weighted average where the probability of each marking is taken into consideration. When
maneuver rates are equal, all markings are equally probable. The individual markings probabilities
are complex calculations as discussed in the previous subsection on the infinitesimal generator of the
reachability graph. As such, we only consider systems with equal maneuver rates for the evaluation
in this subsection.
In Chapter 5, we present Equation 5.9 to calculate the probability of operational nodes being
enabled to maneuver. The model verification feature of Fortified uses this equation to compute the
number and compare it to the measurements of when operational nodes are enabled for maneuver.
In the simulation, we measure this probability by recording the amount of time in which the number
of operational nodes is greater than the minimum and dividing by the total time of the simulation.
Each set of simulations was evaluated by the execution of 100 random experiments each
with 10,000 node maneuvers. The percentage of time is calculated for which the operational nodes
can maneuver, and the mean and standard deviation is calculated for the 100 experiments. As
analyzed in Section 5.4.4, we focus on system configurations where N = 48. We run simulations
using the statistics observed and recorded in Figure 5.7 where we varied the minimum levels of
operational and deceptive nodes. In this previous evaluation, we calculated a ”knee” in the curve
where the minimum operational node count is fixed and the deceptive node count causes the slope
of the probability to exceed the negative diagonal. We choose three different minimum operational
node plots to simulate using three specific values of the deceptive node minimum (greater than, less
than, and at the knee of the curve). The measured and calculated results are shown in Figure 6.4
Each group of bars represents the same minimum level of operational nodes. Each individual
bar height represents the mean of the probability of a operational nodes being enable to maneuver.
The error bar is one standard deviation from the mean while the vertical bar represents the calculated
probability. All measured means are within one standard deviation of the calculated probability of
operational nodes being able to maneuver. These results provide strong support for validation of
our model for operational node maneuvering ability.
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Figure 6.4: Measured vs Calculated Probability of a Operational Node Being Enabled to Maneuver
6.3.3 Probability of Maneuvering Before Attacker Compromise
The final individual probability to validate is the probability of maneuvering before an
attacker can compromise the node. When an node is targeted by an adversary, the node survives
if the deceptive maneuver timer is less than the attacker compromise timer. We show in Chapter
5 that this probability can be calculated as the probability that one exponential random variable
is smaller than another. This probability calculation is a ratio of the first rate divided by the sum
of the rates. For our specific application, the probability is calculated as the deceptive maneuver
rate λdm sec:model-prob-maneuver by the sum of the deceptive maneuver rate and the attacker
compromise rate (λdm + λac).
To evaluate the correctness of this equation from our model, we run simulations using
Fortified to measure the outcome of potential attacks to compare to the model. We conduct these
simulations using the optional attacker module of Fortified with various compromise rates equal to
2n where n ranges between -4 and 4. A static value of 1.0 is used for the two maneuver rates λom and
λdm. Since the calculation of the probability of the maneuver timer being less than the compromise
timer is a proportional calculation based on the ratios of λdm and λac, these setting are sufficient
for comparing the calculation and the measurements. A cluster of size N = 48 and minimums of
O = 0, D = 0 is used for all simulations. Having no minimum number of operational or deceptive
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Figure 6.5: Measured vs Calculated Probability of an Operational Node being Compromised or
Outmaneuvering an Adversary
nodes guarantees our system remains fully maneuverable throughout the simulation. That is, all
compromises of operational nodes are due to the value of the operational maneuver timer and the
attacker compromise timer and not impacted by nodes being unable to maneuver.
We simulate each configuration for 100 runs with each run consisting of 1,000 node maneu-
vers. We record the times an operational node is targeted and the result of the attack as either
a maneuver before compromise or an actual compromise. We calculate the percentages for each
outcome and computed the mean and standard deviation over the 100 runs. The results are plotted
in Figure 6.5 along with the computed probability for each configuration for comparison.
Each group of bars represents a set of simulations where the ratio of the maneuver rate
and the compromise rate were equal. The height of the first bar in each group represents the mean
probability of an attack resulting in a compromise while the second height represents the probability
of a node maneuvering before compromise. The error bar is one standard deviation from the mean
while the horizontal bar represents the calculated probability. All measured means fall within one
standard deviation of the calculated probability of both outcomes. These results provide strong
support for validation of our model for the probability of an operational node’s maneuver timer
being less than an attacker’s compromise timer.
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6.3.4 Overall Probability of Survival
After verifying all three probabilities that compose the overall survival probability, the next
step is to investigate the combination all three components to validate the entire model. We have
shown that the probability of defensive targeting by our modeled attacker is related to the com-
position of the operational and deceptive nodes in the cluster determined as a function of the two
maneuver rates. The probability an operational node is enabled to maneuver has been shown to
match the probability the system is fully or operationally maneuverable. We illustrate, without a
minimum level of operational and deceptive nodes, the probability of an operational node outmaneu-
vering an attacker is determined by the deceptive maneuver rate and the attackers compromise rate.
Studying these three individual probabilities with multiple configurations in our Fortified system,
we validate the overall probability of survival equation (5.8).
To investigate the overall probability of survival, we analyze a cluster composed on nine
nodes (N = 9) with a minimum level of operational nodes of three (O = 3) and the minimum
number of deceptive nodes of two (D = 2). We refer to this configuration as 9 − 3 − 2. This
configuration has been studied in previous chapters and provides a capstone evaluation for the
system. The configuration is large enough to provide interesting results, but at the same time small
enough that the PIPE2 Petri Net solver is able to compute individual state probabilities as needed
in the calculations.
By applying the previous enumeration metrics (Equations 5.1, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 ) of the
cluster we can show that the 9-3-2 configuration has a total of 9,822 total markings. Of these
markings, 1,260 are minimally maneuverable. There are 2,340 operationally maneuverable and
3,528 deceptively maneuverable states. The number of fully maneuverable states is 2,730. A visual
of the enumeration of the state space broken down by values of operational and deceptive nodes is
shown in Figure 6.6.
Equation 5.3 is used to calculate the total number of edges in the reachability graph for
the 9-3-2 configuration. There are 44,604 edges in the graph. Graphically creating such a complex
reachability graph with almost 10,000 nodes and over 44,000 edges requires complex processing
and would provide little information in this document. But a color coded representation of the
infinitesimal generator can provides an indication of the complexity and repetitiveness of the network.
Figure 6.7 provides a visual of the sparsely populated matrix of dimensions 9822 x 9822 (96 million
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Figure 6.6: Visual depiction of the maneuverable states of a 9-3-2 Fortified System
cells) populated twice by each of the 44,604 edges. The presence of a color represents an edge from
the source node on the x-axis to the destination node on the y-axis. Colors are enlarged to be visible
and not drawn to scale. A light blue color indicates a transition between an minimally maneuverable
state and an operational state, in either direction. A light red spot is an indication of edges between
minimally maneuverable and deceptively maneuverable. Light green represent transitions between
operationally maneuverable and fully maneuverable. While orange represent transitions between
deceptive and fully maneuverable. Dark blue represent edges between operationally maneuverable
states, while red represent edges between deceptively maneuverable states. Lastly yellow blocks are
transitions from one fully maneuverable state to another.
To validate the correctness of the overall probability model, we ran the Fortified system in
a 9-3-2 configuration in discrete event simulation mode over a set of maneuver rates and attacker
compromise rates. Three values (1.0, 2.0 and 4.0) are considered for each of the three rates. All
27 possible combinations are explored, though some combinations have similar characteristics since
the ratios of the rates and not the actual values impact the behavior of the system. Each system is
described as a three-tuple with the operational maneuver rate listed first, followed by the deceptive
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Figure 6.7: Visual depiction of the infinitesimal generator of a 9-3-2 Fortified System
maneuver rate, and concluded by the attacker compromise rate. Each rate is delimited by a dash,
so the string 1.0-2.0-4.0 describes a configuration where λom = 1.0, λdm = 2.0, and λac = 4.0.
Each experiment is executed 100 times for each of the 27 configurations. An experiment
consists of running the simulation for a total of 100,000 jumps while the attacker continuously targets
an active node. Due to the different values of the maneuver rates and attacker rate, the total count
of events when the attacker targeted a node varies for each configuration. The attack count range is
approximately between 9,000 and 50,000 with a mean of 22,000. The number of times an operational
and deceptive nodes is targeted is recorded along with the two possible results for each type of target
(a compromise or an outmaneuver). The percentage of targets resulting in each of the four possible
outcomes is calculated. We are interested in the percentage of times in which an attack did not
result in an operational node becoming compromised.
Figure 6.8 plots this percentage in the y-axis for each of the 27 configurations as a box-plot
of each experiments survival percentage. Each box identifies first and third quartiles, the red line
indicates the median, and the whiskers show 1.5 interquartile range (IQR). The results for each
configuation is plotted along the same value along the x-axis with the dashed configuration label
indicating the values of the maneuver rates and the compromise rate. Additionally, the modeled
probability using Equation 5.8 for each configuration is shown as an upward pointing orange triangle.
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Figure 6.8: Box-plots of survival of 9-3-2 under various rates and calculated bounds
An downward pointing orange triangle is plotted to represent the value of Equation 5.8 at the
point where the maximize probability of an operational node is enabled to maneuver, at 1.0. The
connecting orange line between the two triangles presents the bounded expected range for the survival
probabilities.
Figure 6.8 shows that results based on the model are exceeded by all experiments during
all configurations of the system. The probability of survival as shown in Equation 5.8 is a lower
bound to the observed results when using the Fortified system in discrete event simulation mode.
An upper bound to the plot is equal to the probability of survival when the operational nodes are
always able to maneuver Pm = 1. For some configurations shown, this range is very large (almost
30%) while for some the range is negligible. The box-plot of all observed survivals from targeting
by the attacker always fall within this bound. The observed survival probability typically falls in
the lower half of the range when all rates are equal. In some cases when the maneuver rates are 4
times the attacker rate, we see the box-plot fall in the upper half of our range.
Further analysis of the results from the 27 configurations provides understanding of the
features that cause the system to behave better than anticipated. We focus on the results of the
experiments with regards to each targeting attempt. By dividing the total number of times in which
a defensive node is targeted by the total targeting attempts, the probability of defensive targeting
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Figure 6.9: Plot of Observed vs Calculated Deceptive Targeting Probability
can be calculated. The means of the observed probabilities of an attacker targeting a deceptive node
are plotted alongside their calculated probabilities in Figure 6.9. This plot also includes the previous
box-plots of total survivability for comparison. Figure 6.9 shows the observed deceptive targeting
probability are very close in proximity to the calculated probability. As the attacker’s compromise
rate increases, the margins of error decrease. This can be explained because the sample size of the
number of attackers increases with a higher attacker compromise rate.
Since deceptive nodes are targeted at the modeled rate, the conclusion can be made that
operational nodes are surviving attacks at a higher probabliity than expected. We previously de-
scribe a targeted operational node surviving compromise when it is enabled to maneuver and the
maneuver time is less than the compromise timer of the attacker. We will refer to probability that
an operational node, regardless of maneuverability state, maneuvers before it is compromised as the
probability of outmaneuver. The model calculates this probability as the product of the probabilities
of maneuver enablement and the probability of maneuver time being less than compromise time.
Figure 6.10 shows the calculated outmaneuver probability, along with the observed outmaneuver
probability. For comparison, we include the box-plots of the observed survival probabilities of the
27 configurations.
Figure 6.10 shows the observed and calculated outmaneuver probabilities in groups of three.
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Figure 6.10: Plot of observed vs calculated operational node outmaneuver probability
All three points in each group have the same operational and deceptive maneuver rates. Each point
only differs in the attacker’s compromise rate. As the compromise rate increases, the observed
outmaneuver probability approaches the calculated probability. The explanation of this behavior is
due to the decreasing mean for the attacker compromise time as the rate increases. This decreasing
window of time cause the sampling of the outmaneuver instances to be a closer match of the steady-
state probability of an operational node being enabled to maneuver. When the mean of attacker
compromise time is larger, the maneuverability of the operational nodes is better than steady state
due to the maneuvers that occur during this window.
Additionally, there are very small bounded ranges for the probability of survival for in-
stances when the operational maneuver rate is more than twice the deceptive maneuver rate. This
observation is because as the probability of operational node maneuver enablement approaches 1,
the upper and lower bounds approach the probability of the maneuver time being smaller than the




The model validation results from the discrete event simulation execution mode of the
prototype resource maneuver manager allows us to adjust the model. Previously, Equation 5.8
shows the calculation of an absolute value for the probability that a targeted operational node can
survive. These results show that that this calculation is actually a worse-case probability. As such,
the bounded results for the probably of survival (Psurvival) are presented in Equation 6.1:
Pdt + (1− Pdt) ∗ Pm ∗ P (tm < tc) ≤ Psurvive ≤ Pdt + (1− Pdt) ∗ P (tm < tc) (6.1)
Furthermore, we enhance and reinforce the principles provides in Rules of Thumb #3 and
#5. The third rule suggests using the ratio of the operational and deceptive maneuver rates to
control the operational composition of the cluster. Additionally, it has been shown that increasing
the ratio increases the probability of maneuver thus creating a small bounded probability of survival.
Though the results in Figure 6.8 also show that a lower ratio between operational and deceptive
maneuver rate improves survivability due to its impact on the probability of defensive targeting. The
fifth rule of thumb recommends maintaining the deceptive maneuver rate higher than the estimated
attacker compromised rate based on threat analysis and intelligence collecting. This recommendation
holds true for the ratio of the operational maneuver rate and the attacker compromise rate also.
The four best probabilities of survivals shown in Figure 6.8 are when both the operational and
deceptive maneuver rates are at least twice that of the attackers rates. The highest probability
is when both maneuver rates are four times the compromise rate. This reinforces the importance
of system designers to understand not only the capabilities of the attacker but also how fast the
distributed system can maneuver between modes of operation.
An updated list of rules of thumb for the defensive cyber maneuverable platform is presented
below:
Rule of Thumb #1: Set the minimal operational node parameter just above the
operational breaking point of your system.
Rule of Thumb #2: Set the minimal deceptive node parameter as equal to or
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just less than the minimum number of operational nodes.
Rule of Thumb #3: Increase the availability of operation nodes in the DMCP
by increasing the operational maneuver rate. This also creates a more operationally
maneuverable cluster thus increases the ability to outmaneuver an attacker. Maneuver
the DMCP to a more deceptive and defendable state by decreasing the operational ma-
neuver rate. Additionally, this action improve operational node survival by increasing
the probability a defensive node is targeted.
Rule of Thumb #4: Ensure the operational and deceptive maneuver rates are
limited to ensure the underlying distributed and parallel system does not break from
having nodes maneuver too frequently.
Rule of Thumb #5: Set the operational and deceptive maneuver rate higher
than the estimated attacker compromise rate
In this chapter, we have present research in the area of combining multiple pieces from our
preceding systems to build Fortified, the Prototype Resource Maneuver Manager. This software
implementation synergistically integrates the resource provisioning aspects of JUMMP along the
security enhancements of the DMCP. Fortified will shows how various aspect of military maneuver
combined together are used to build prototype maneuver applications will providing enhancements
to distributed computing. Additionally, Fortified has verified and enhanced the Petri-Net model for




In this dissertation, we present our motivations for maneuver in cyberspace operations
and present our work in designing, building, and modeling maneuverable applications. Our work
focuses on provision resources, optimizing applications, and improving cybersecurity. Our work
culminates with the integration of our previous works into a prototype resource maneuver manager
which validates our model for a maneuver system in the presence of an potential intruder. This
work demonstrates how the military concept of maneuver can be applied to distributed and parallel
computing in multiple facets.
In the area of resource provisioning, the Job Uninterrupted Maneuverable MapReduce Plat-
form deploys a Hadoop cluster within an existing academic high performance computing environ-
ment. JUMMP supports high availability and continuous computing for research and education
while incurring no additional financial or administrative overhead. It shows as efficient as a persis-
tent Hadoop cluster on dedicated computing resources, depending on the jump time. The cluster
remains stable, with good performance, in the presence of jumps that occur as frequently as the
average length of reduce tasks.
As for application optimization, our work with the Flow Optimized Route Configuration En-
gine provides the design and prototype development of a datacenter testbed with a reprogrammable
network topology. Our testbed includes a Virtual Topology Engine that builds virtual network
topologies over physical links with SDN flows and a Flow Network Evaluation system to generate
a network congestion estimation score. We highlight the design and portray the development of a
Hadoop shuffle traffic simulator placing realistic loads on datacenter networks. Experimental results
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indicate placement of computation racks within a datacenter topology potentially has significant
impact of the Hadoop shuffle traffic completion time.
Our research into modeling a Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform with Stochastic Petri
Nets demonstrates cybersecurity improvement through maneuver. This model introduces a dis-
tributed and parallel application utilizing moving target defense and deceptive defense tactics to
increase survivability in the presence of a cyberattack. We analyze our SPN model to understand
the trade-offs between security and operations in defensive maneuver cyber platform. We make
recommendations for how using and extending our current SPN model to build prototype systems
implementing moving target and deceptive defense in parallel and distributed applications.
Lastly, We present our work in building a prototype maneuver resource manager integrating
our previous works. Our prototype system utilizes operational and deceptive Hadoop installations,
a discrete event simulator driven by an intelligent scheduler based on modeled parameters for a
maneuverable system, and a model verification and validation ability helping to solidify the findings
our Petri Net model.
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